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This Article is the introductory chapter of a book currently
being written and tentatively entitled, Berle & Means: The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property Revisited 1932 to The
Present. Subsequent chapters will be appearing in future issues
of the Tulsa Law Journal
I. THE CLASSICAL MODEL AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
One of the deepest undercurrents of Western culture that has sur-
faced within the last two or three centuries to influence profoundly
Western thought has been that of Economics. Those who have thought
about and written on the subject have swayed decisions of numerous
rulers, be they monarch, dictator, ecclesiastic, president, premier, or
chairman of some revolutionary party, affecting almost all walks of life.
For economics asks that eternal and plaguy question: How do we go
about making a living by the best use of our property for production
and trade, and profit thereby?---even at the risk, according to the Apos-
tle Matthew, of losing our souls if we should overreach ourselves. In-
deed, such conglomerations of humans given legal status as persons
called corporations and such looser associations as partnerships must
never lose sight of the problem. Economics supplies several answers,
none of the solutions without their different interpretations and ambi-
guities.
One of the answers having a long history behind it is that of the
"Classical Model." The Classical Model is shaped around the germinal
idea of a free society whose principal components consist of men born
with natural, inalienable rights yet ever seeking to realize their desires
1978]
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as well as profits for their own self-interest; and a government created
for the purpose of protecting but not depriving them of their rights, for
men will be guided in their transactions by what is good for them and,
hence, good for society as a whole. The model functions by means of
that ineffable quality which distinguishes men from other living crea-
tures: the Logos or reason. The purpose of this article, then, is to ex-
amine the Classical Model by first sketching in its historical
background, so influential in its formation, in order at last to demon-
strate how the idea of property along with its qualities and governance,
through a remarkable metamorphosis, moved gradually from the pe-
riphery as a relatively unimportant element to become the Model's ver-
itable heart.
Yet, because history has viewed the so-called cultural aspects of
man's endeavors as somehow distinct from his economic practices the
science of economics is a youngster compared to the more venerable
disciplines. The human animal may now be called an economic animal,




Telly: The Classical Economic Model and the Nature of Property in the Ei
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
THE NA TURE OF PROPERTY
TABLE I
MTeCuc iddle Ages Scoasiis
TeC=h Aquinas coastim
1215th [ CenturiesRise of National States Il Te Main Stt
L' 
-DietRlati,




Frnc Theeris Clssca German
I IIeals[ icrti s --[





iC e ath em ati c S ch oo l
Switzerland Wairas Pareto England Edgewort h








Neo-Classical Synthesis I Econometrics I
Principles of Economics 1890
Welfare Institutional





- Ter o 
.. Aggregs tesEconomicn -c Macsoeconomics
THE DavEcwrsre%-r OF ECONoMic THoireT




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JOUIRNAL
The development of economic thought can be described succinctly
by the following outline:
I. The essentials of Economics are found in Ancient thought (1000
B. C.-476 A.D.)
A. Hebraic concepts included those of property, agriculture,
commerce, money: such as taxes and loans.
B. Greek thought, especially in Plato (427-347 B.C.) and
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), centered on the state, division of la-
bor, slavery, money, property, exchange and finance.
C. Roman ideas were drawn from the Greek, but were shaped
and augmented by the Roman concept of the centralized
state and its promulgated laws which included those of pri-
vate property, contract, and, philosophically, a "natural"
law.
II. Medieval thought (476 A.D. - 1500 A.D.) developed under the
influence of the Christian Church andfeudalism.
A. The work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was a major influ-
ence inasmuch as it synthesized the doctrines of the Church
with Aristotelian thought.
B. The concepts of just price, division of labor, trade and
private property were of prime importance in the develop-
ment of economic ideas during these feudal times.
III. The beginning of Modern Economics (1600-1776) occurred with the
gradual disappearance of feudalism and the emergence of
nationalism.
A. The earlier moral and religious disapproval of commerce
and trade was supplanted by an emphasis upon these activi-
ties as vital to development of national aspirations.
B. Mercantilism thus became the means whereby the state
might control economic life in order to maintain political
strength and independence of the nation through a favorable
balance in foreign trade.
C. The practices of mercantilism, existing from approximately
1613-1767, never assumed a coherent system.
1. The practices were primarily one-sided and negative
commercial operations, with a tendency toward opportu-
nistic expediency.
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a. Precious metals were considered the most desirable
form of national wealth.
b. A nation lacking natural resources of such wealth
could obtain it through trade.
c. Accumulation of precious metals was therefore
dependent upon a favorable balance of trade and
this, in turn, on an excess of exports over imports.
d. Colonies could be useful both as markets for exports
and as sources of supply for raw materials, including
precious metals.
e. Colonies, moreover, could be only feeders to the
mother country and were prohibited from manufac-
turing lest they upset her trade balance and exhaust
supplies of raw materials. In effect, all colonial trade
was considered a monopoly of the mother country.'
D. Following mercantilism was a period of transitional ideas
that resulted from the emergence of Liberal thought (1651-
1776). In less than a century, the concept of economics be-
came of vital interest, particularly to certain British thinkers,
such as William Petty (1623-1687), Josiah Child (1630-1699),
James Denham Steuart (1712-1780).
The Physiocratic school (1756-1778) developed in France
as the direct result of intolerable political and economic con-
ditions arising from years of wars and government extrava-
gance. For some twenty years, minimization of regulatory
controls, and maximization of economic freedom was the ar-
gument of such men as Francois Quesnay (1694-1774), Rich-
ard Cantillon (1685?-1734), Anne Robert Jacques Turgot
(1727-1781), and others.z
IV. The development of The Classical Economic Theory (1776-1875)
required the synthesizing of diverse ideas appropriate to creation of
an organic whole.
A. In economics, Adam Smith (1723-1790) produced a synthesis
in his masterpiece, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of
The Wealth of Nations (1776).
1. J. BELL, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 59 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as BELL,
ECONOMIC THOUGHT].
2. Their argument derived from the conviction that a natural order governed the affairs of
men, and that man's task was to discover and to conform to it. For this reason duPont deNemours
coined from the Greek the term physiocrafi4 or physiocracy, meaning the "rule of nature."
1978]
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B. The "Classical Theory of Economics" is the generic term for
that body of doctrines synthesized and developed by Smith,
and augmented by such men as Thomas Robert Malthus
(1766-1834), David Ricardo (1772-1823), James Mill (1773-
1836), and J. B. Say (1767-1832). Their disciples and, in some
respects, publicists were N. W. Senior (1790-1864), John Stu-
art Mill (1806-1873), J. E. Cairnes (1824-1875), and Henry
Fawcett (1833-1884).'
Is There a Classical Theory?
Despite the commonalty of the term "Classical Theory," economists
disagree as to whether, in fact, a theory, as such, ever existed. If, in-
deed, it did, then there must be discoverable criteria for determining
the manner and mode of its existence. Lord Robbins supports the no-
tion of a theory per se.4 On the other hand, Mark Blaug concludes that
the so-called Ricardian Theory of Economic Policy is a myth.' More-
over, Frank Knight argues that the classical economists "never devel-
oped either a clear and defensible program of action or a 'theory', of
economic policy."6 Robbins, of course, urges that there was the general
body of principles of governmental action or inaction. . . in regard to
economic activity.7 Samuels, however, speaks of any economic system
as a decision-making process through which the basic economic
problems are continuously resolved." In his view, the chief problem
thus becomes the manner in which the economy is organized and con-
trolled and "comprises a theory of the structure and operation of a par-
ticular economic decision-making process."9 In light of these several
opinions, it seems possible to propose that there is a notion of a Classi-
cal Economic Theory.
What is clear, however, is that some theorists conceive of the so-
called classical theory as a recognizable concept having certain defina-
3. Karl Marx was the originator of the term "classical economics." K. MARX, A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 56 (M. Stone trans. 1911).
4. L. ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 2-3 (1952) [hereinafter cited as ROBBINS, ENGLISH CLASSICAL].
5. M. BLAuG, RICARDIAN ECONOMICS 194 (1958) [hereinafter cited as BLAUo, RICARDIAN].
6. Theory ofEconomic Policy and the History of Doctrine, 63 ETHICS 287 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Knight, History a/Doctrine]; Checkland, The Prescrigtionsfor the Classical Economlsts 20
ECONOMICA 71 (1953) [hereinfter cited as Checkland, Prescr491ion]; W. SAMUELS, THE CLASSI-
CAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1966) [hereinafter cited as SAMUELS, THE CLASSICAL THE-
ORY].
7. ROBBINS, ENGLISH CLASSICAL, supra note 4, at 177-81.
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ble parts as elements. Moreover, all theorists accept that certain funda-
mental ideas have been asserted by numerous earlier and influential
economic thinkers.
However, whether or not this body of ideas constitutes a formal
economic theory is not the concern of this article. The intention here is
rather to consider certain basic ideas as elements to be utilized in con-
structing what we may call a "model" of the so-called classical theory.
Clearly any such construction must be a hypothetical one, inasmuch as
some economic thinkers disagree on the definition of "theory," and
others on the question of what may constitute the elements in such a
theory.10 Moreover, economists who reject the notion of a model may
do so through their reluctance to define what are the essential ideas
posited by classical theorists.
Nonetheless, it is not only possible but also practical to construct a
model of classical economic theory sufficient to the purpose of this arti-
cle. This means that generally recognized ideas of classical theorists
will thereby be synthesized to the extent that they may constitute a
model of that theory. More specifically, the model to be utilized here is
that proposed by Professor Grossman of the University of California at
Berkeley, which is known as "Anglia: The Perfect Competition
Model." 1 I
Grossman's model has nine components which provide an appro-
priate and convenient framework within which to develop the proposi-
tion of this article. The elements that make up the Grossman model
may be outlined as follows:
1. All resources are privately owned.
2. Firms are managed by owner-entrepreneurs who aim to
maximize profits.
3. Households seek to maximize incomes.
4. No firm, let alone a household, is large enough to affect in
the market the prices of things that it sells and buys
("Competition"). 12
5. Laissez-faire is observed by the government.
10. For example, Checkland raises many questions and takes issue with the position of Rob-
bins. See Checkland, Prescrptions, supra note 6, at 71.
11. Grossmag Economic Systems, in 14 FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN ECONOMIC SERIES 55-56
(2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GROSSMAN, Economic Systems]. See alsoW. BUCKINHAM, JR.,
THEORETICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 37-55 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
BUCKINGHAM, THEORETICAL SYSTEMS].
12. Grossman entitled the system "Perfect Competition" but, as will be seen in a following
section, "Competition" is more accurate for classical theory.
1978]
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6. Households have freedom of household choice and firms
have freedom of enterprise.
7. Prices move freely.
8. The market mechanism coordinates production and dis-
tributes income.
9. Labor is unorganized, and other factors of production re-
ceive the rewards that the market concedes them.
1 3
This article will examine in detail each of these nine sections as
distinctive parts of the Grossman model. Analysis of each element in
the Grossman model will illustrate and define the conditions under
which the theory of property was first developed. Furthermore, it will
serve as a lead-in to a consideration of the Classical Model as the key-
stone of modem corporate structure. Many theorists of today are una-
ware of the extent to which corporations are manifestations of the
traditional, or Classical Model, theory of ownership of property. With-
out such a buoy or beacon to guide them they may be as badly off as
those described by Leonardo da Vinci in a maritime simile: "Those
who give themselves to ready and rapid practice before they have
learned the theory resemble sailors who go to sea in a vessel without a
rudder."' 4
II. PART I OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: ALL RESOURCES
ARE PRIVATELY OWNED
The central idea of the eighteenth-century classical economic theo-
rists was that man, by his nature, had an inalienable right to "life, lib-
erty, and estate."' 5 This concept of man's absolute and natural right to
property was expressed in various ways, all of which meant, in effect,
the same thing. Blackstone, for example, said that property is "that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."' 16
Several definitions of property by American courts also represent
this point of view; for example, property is "the exclusive right of pos-
sessing, enjoying and disposing of a thing."' 7 Or again, it is "the highest
right a man can have to anything; property being used for that right
13. GROSSMAN, Economic Systems supra note 11, at 55-56.
14. BUCKINGHAM, THEORETICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 11, epigraph.
15. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 158-59, 180, 187 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as LOCKE, Two TREATISES].
16. W. BLACKSTONE, Blackstone's Commentaries, in 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF EN-
GLAND 1 (G. Tucker ed. 1969).
17. McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, (1858); see also R. ELY, 1 PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN
[Vol. 13:406
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which we have both to lands or tenements, goods, or chattels, which no
way depends on another man's courtesy." 18 Similarly,
The right of acquiring and possessing property and having it
protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and inalienable
rights of man. Men have a sense of property; property is nec-
essary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural
wants and desires; its security was one of the objects that in-
duced them to unite Society. No man would become a mem-
ber of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of
his honest labor and industry. The preservation of property
then, is a primary object of the social compact.9
Such a theory of property, of course, did not generate spontane-
ously, but developed from many earlier ideas. These provided the
foundation upon which new ideas, necessary in new circumstances,
were built. But while new concepts develop to meet new needs, the idea
of property remains central, because it is vital in establishing man's
relation to the state and his place in the social context.
Indeed, human history shows that such ideas retain their vitality
precisely because they are seminal in man's definition of his relation-
ship to the general ethos of his civilization. In this relationship, three
ideas emerge as paramount. These are: (1) the relation of the individual
to the state; (2) the basis of this relationship; and (3) the consequent
relationship between men and property.
The first pertains to the opposing concepts of right and privilege.
One idea assumes that man is an individual, with rights separate from
those of the state, and that the duty of the state is, therefore, to protect
those rights. The other idea upholds the primacy of the state, assuming
that, rather than having inherent rights, the individual is granted privi-
leges by the state.
The second idea, positing a relationship between the individual
and the state, involves the opposing notions of natural law and of
convention. On the one hand, exercise of certain rights (such as to prop-
erty) is accepted as indigenous in man; on the other, such "rights" are
considered purely conventional and, therefore, not inalienable.
THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 106 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ELY, PROP-
ERTY AND CONTRACT].
18. Jackson v. Housel, 17 Johns. 281 (N.Y. 1820); see also ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT,
supra note 17, at 107.
19. VanHorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304 (1795); see also ELY, PROPERTY AND CON-
TRACT, supra note 17, at 107.
1978]
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.Finally, theories of the relationship between men and property ar-
gue either that property is an absolute and private right or that the state
permits exercise of property rights only in the interests of the commu-
nity as a whole.
These three seminal ideas, as well as the centrality of property in
eighteenth-century classical theory, provide a framework for discussing
property in terms of the major periods of its development. For the
Greek, the Roman Stoic, the Medieval, and the eighteenth century (or
Enlightenment) periods were all concerned with the individual's rela-
tion to the state, with the basis for this relationship, and with the conse-
quences of this relationship to the idea of property.
A. Natural Law and Rights
Natural Law and Rights are not only present in the concept of
Property, but are omnipresent throughout the model. Of the nine sec-
tions of the Classical Model (herein often referred to as the Classical
Economic Theory as an interchangeable term), this section requires the
most extensive development. One reason is that property has been a
motivating power behind mankind's continuing adjustments to his own
character, to himself as a social being, and to that sense of justice that
has led him to create systems of jurisprudence. The classical theorists
on property based their particular model on the two ideas of Natural
Law and Rights, both of which are central to the concept of freedom or
liberty. Accordingly, the dicussion of each part of the model accepts as
fundamental the underlying assumptions of Natural Law and Rights.
Because it is essential that the reader thoroughly understand the
concepts, the discussion of property is presented first, and a careful
analysis made of the two related ideas, especially in the section on
Greek thought.
B. Greek Ideas
The Polis (State)-and Rights as Considered by the Greeks
The Politics of Aristotle, more than any other work, presents an
orderly and comprehensive idea of what the Greeks meant by the
state.20 Notwithstanding the fact that his is an ideal conception of a
state that was already a thing of the past, if it ever existed at all, his
conception is not an arbitrary one. Rather, it is an accurate manifesta-
tion of the Greek ideal.
20. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (R. McKeon ed. 1941) [herein-
after cited as McKeon, THE BASIC WORKS).
[Vol. 13:406
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Moreover, the conception in the Politics is more realistic than that
found in Plato's Republic. For while Aristotle regards reconstruction of
the state as necessary, he avoids Plato's severe break with the past."
To examine the Greek notion of a "state" is to be reminded that
the word itself comes from the Latin status. At the time of its sixteenth-
century adoption into English, status referred to the standing or posi-
tion of person(s) in authority. With the passage of time the term "state"
has, of course, come to refer generally to a given political and economic
entity. Nonetheless, the modem sense of the term retains implications
of the role of "authority" in that entity.
The Greek pols, on the other hand, had altogether different con-
notations which derive from its denotation of "our city." There is a
sense of wholeness, of unity, of a partnership in belonging, that pre-
cludes any distinction between the individual and the city.22
The term polis is, accordingly, a more accurate designation here
than is the word "state." For the polis existed not merely for the sake of
"life" but primarily for the "good life," that being the ultimate aim of
man. The function of the state was to make possible the development in
the individual of his personal and intellectual powers. Its obligation
was to teach him ways for attaining full stature as an ideal man. As in
Athens, it developed the practical, the productive, and the theoretical
arts in light of this one all-encompassing aim. The role of the polis,
then, quite literally involved every member of the body polls, or, as we
put it today, "the body politic."
The concept of a purely profane polis, or the polis as distinct from
religion, was altogether foreign to Greek thought. From its inception,
the character of the polis was inherently sacred, and religious ritual was
woven naturally into the socio-political texture of life. Moreover, its
sacred nature made of the polis a dwelling-place for the protecting gods
and thereby the embodiment of socio-political morality.
For this reason, to understand the nature of the polis requires an
awareness of its ethical dimensions. The idea of political science, for
instance, is related to moral philosophy rather than to the Roman no-
tion of jurisprudence; for the terms of Greek political science are those
of ethics. To understand the nature of the polis is to appreciate the
difference between a moral and legal emphasis. Questions of political
power, legal rights, or distribution of taxes can be viewed in a legal
21. PLATO, The Dialogues of Plato, in 1 THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett trans. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Jowett, Plato].
22. ARISTOTLE, THE PoLrrTcs OF ARISTOTLE lxiii (E. Barker trans. & ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Barker, THE POLITICS].
1978]
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context. But the polis must be discussed in a moral context, where all
other principles are subsumed by the moral principle.
This is not to say that law had no place in the Greek notion of the
polis. On the contrary, it occupied a most important place, inasmuch as
men were to be educated and improved by law. For law inculcated
those moral and social virtues upon which rested civilization itself. But
again, it is clear that the central principle of the society is morality.
Political Science must be regarded as "the ethics of the whole society,
which coheres in virtue of a common moral purpose: it must determine
the 'good' of such a society, the structure by which its 'good' will be
realized, the action by which it will best be secured."23 Ideally, the good
of the individual is the same as the good of society. Private virtue in the
individual is ideally public virtue in the polis. Political science codifies
the whole duty of man in his environment and the fullness of his ac-
tions and relations. Political science, therefore, has three dimensions: a
theory of the state (polis), a theory of morals, and a theory of law.
This conception of political science underlies the essential differ-
ences between the Greek political thought and our own. For the con-
cept of the polis as an ethical association, existing for the attainment of
virtue, requires a different idea of the relation of polis to individual.
Although the Greek citizen clearly saw himself as having worth in and
influencing the action of his community, "the fact remains that in the
political thought of Greece the notion of the individual is not promi-
nent, and the conception of rights seems hardly to have been at-
tained."24 It may well be that the individual's confidence in his role as a
citizen superseded any notion of the need to assert specific rights
against the general whole. For modem man regards the state from a
negative and suspicious viewpoint. And it must be remembered that
such an anxious view was alien to the Greek mind. Consequently, the
individual citizen had little, if any, concept of private or personal
rights. In its ultimate sense, then, the Greek idea of the polls admits the
sovereignty of the state while assuming that the goals of the citizen are
inherent in the goals of the state. And while this requires the individual
to look to the state's exercise of its power, it does not, at the same time,
suggest that he has any rights, as such, existing outside his relation to
the state.
23. E. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO AND His PREDECESSORS 6 (1918) [herein-
after cited as BARKER, POLITICAL THEORY].
24. Id at 7.
[Vol. 13:406
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Natural Law as Considered by the Greeks
The concept of Natural Law, so fundamental in Greek thought,
was the essential theme that permeated much of Greek thinking before
Plato and Aristotle. Theories of Natural Law may be traced to the fifth-
century B.C. period of sophist enlightenment in Greece." "In Greek
philosophy natural law appears as a valiant and precocious effort to
rationalize a world in which the appearance was chaos and conflict and
the aspiration was order."26
Despite its presence in Greek tradition, the idea emerges in "bits
and pieces," falling short of any recognizable philosophy until Plato
and, more especially, Aristotle. The reason behind the following devel-
opment is that the question has been debated whether or not Plato and
Aristotle were in fact Natural Law theorists.
The Greek Word Physis-Nature
The Greek concept of Natural Law involves the Greek sense of the
word physis. Our notion of it relates to the Latin natura, which (when
used with a verb) denotes birth and thereby has connotations of primo-
geniture, etc. To appreciate the distinct sense of the Greek physis, how-
ever, is to remember that this word (when used with a verb) connotes
growth or growing; hence it may be used in a transitive sense (e.g., the
growing of a family or of teeth). It suggests an entire process, from
inception to completion, and can be applied, as well, to the concept of
men and the polis. Thus, when Aristotle says, "the polis is by physis,"
this can be literally translated as "the state exists by nature." However,
it is now essential to bear in mind the above-noted distinction between
the Greek physis and the Latin natura, if we are to understand clearly
the sense of Aristotle's statement. Moreover, his use of this word in the
Ethics, the Poetics, and the Rhetoric, connotes "form" or "essence," a
meaning much broader than that afforded "nature" in modem English
usage. For example, "Form, therefore, is nature." "By form I mean the
essence or very nature of the thing." For it is physis that connotes the
process of growth, the condition of being grown, and the beginnings of
growing.27
25. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATURAL SCIENCES, NATURAL LAW (1933 ed.); Gerhart, The Doctrine
of Natural Law, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 76, 81-83 (1951).
26. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTIONAL LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 215 (1947).




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Natural Law Defned and as Considered by the Greeks
To discuss Natural Law requires a precise definition of the terms
themselves. For example, John Wild defines Natural Law as consisting
of five basic doctrines: (1) The world is an order of divergent tendencies
which on the whole support one another. (2) Each individual entity is
marked by an essential structure which it shares in common with other
members of the species. (3) This structure determines certain basic exis-
tential tendencies that are also common to the species. (4) If these ten-
dencies are to be realized without distortion and frustration, they must
follow a general dynamic pattern. This pattern is what is meant by nat-
ural law. It is grounded on real structure, and is enforced by inexorable
natural sanctions. (5) Good and evil are existential categories. It is good
for an entity to exist in a condition of active realization. If its basic
tendencies are hampered and frustrated, it exists in an evil condition.28
These premises may be accepted as a reasonable and valid defini-
tion of Natural Law. If to hold these theses is to be a Natural Law
theorist, then Aristotle qualifies as such a one.29 First, the world is an
order of divergent tendencies which on the whole support one another.
Aristotle's writings are pervaded with the word "nature" in reference to
the changing universe. The universe, he insists, is one of ceaseless flux
and this evolution is not a random process.3 0 Rather, change proceeds
according to a purpose or a cosmic ordering. Generally, "nature never
makes anything without a purpose and never leaves out what is neces-
sary."" It functions systematically or methodically "since everything
that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can
be."32 The presence of order, and the thrust of all things toward a pur-
poseful end "are to be found in nature's works in the highest degree,
and the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of
the beautiful. 33
Second, each individual entity is marked by an essential structure
which it shares in common with other members of the species. Aristotle
is positive in his assertion that every individual substance has a dwell-
28. J. WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 134 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES].
29. Aristotle is generally considered the "founder" or "father" of natural law and, rather than
Plato, will be so considered here. More material on Aristotle and natural law is available in WILD,
PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES, supra note 28, at 134-56, 158-72; BARKER, POLITICAL THEORY, supra
note 23, at 326-30; Barker, THE POLITICS, supra note 22, at lxxii-lxxiii.
30. McKeon, Physics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 229.
31. Id De.4mlma, in THE BASIC WORKS, supranote 20, at 597.
32. Id Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 946.
33. Id Parts of Animals, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 657.
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ing structure, called eidos, of its own. The matter of substance of nature
which has been created through evolution embodies the matter from
which it came. In this sense, nature implies a definite structure. In the
Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses the form (i.e., eidos) of what is gener-
ated as well as that which generates it----"the so-called 'formal' [eidetic]
nature."34 Hence, the most important element here is the determinate
form which makes the thing what it is. Nature is this determinate struc-
ture, itself the basis for consequent powers and actions of the entity3
Third, this structure determines certain basic existential tendencies
that are also common to the species. Aristotle's philosophy assumes the
principles of change and evolution in which all entities are involved. Of
"all things," he says in the Physics, "each of them has within itself a
principle of motion and of stationariness."36 Of what does this indwell-
ing consist? Aristotle's answer is "that nature in the primary and strict
sense is the essence [or form] of things which have in themselves, as
such, a source of movement. 3
7
Aristotle argues that natural tendencies should, of course, be cor-
rectly directed in their beginning stages. In things which have no cogni-
tion, this direction comes about automatically [to anagkaion.38 But in
the cognitive man, possessed of self-direction, the proper direction does
not occur automatically.39 The correct direction of this imperceptible
trend (or drift), therefore, is a cognitive function.4 °
Fourth, if these tendencies are to be realized without distortion
and frustration, they must follow a general dynamic pattern. This pat-
tern is what is meant by natural law. The term "virtue" is central in
Aristotelian thinking, and it pertains to obligation and value. In the
Nicomachean Ethics, he argues that "the virtue of man also will be the
state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do
his work well."41 Man, however, is not alone in virtues. Any body has
its virtue or active tendency to perform well. By way of example, he
notes that "[t]he excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work
good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well." 42 Horses
and other animals, therefore, possess "virtue." Accordingly, "every vir-
34. Id Metaphysics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 792.
35. WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES, supra note 28, at 160.
36. McKeon, Physics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 236.
37. Id Metaphtyscs, supra note 20, at 756.
38. Id De Poetica, supra note 20, at 1455.
39. Id.
40. WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES, supra note 28, at 161-62.
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tue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it
is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well." 43
Thus, when man's indistinct urge toward realization is set in its proper
direction, toward its natural fulfillment, that is virtue. Evil action,
therefore, is contrary to nature, while virtue is "natural when it brings
to actuality the proper activities that [fire or earth] potentially pos-
sess."
44
The first stages of man's tendencies toward realization are weak.
Hence, it is most important to establish rational control over them in
their early stages. And although we possess the virtue inherently, it is a
tendency only, and therefore still far from its goal. And that goal, of
course, is the ultimate value.45
Fifth, good and evil are existential categories. It is good for an
entity to exist in a condition of active realization. The end, Aristotle
declares, is the good which has "rightly been declared to be that at
which all things aim."46 And this good that "the action is the end, and
the actuality is the action. And so even the word 'actuality' is derived
from 'action', and points to the complete reality. '47 The end of an in-
strumental process, such as building or knitting, lies beyond the process
itself, in the product by that process. If life were such a process, only
our dead bodies would be its product. But the value of life is the "pro-
cess of living"; that is, the value is in and of the process itself. Here,
then, "value" is no fixed quality but rather the quality of the process as
it proceeds. The incipient value is already in action which realizes itself
in actions of completion.
All the elements or components of this structure are held together
by nature. And the entities of nature constantly change, tending to-
wards something beyond. Thus goodness evolves from nature, it is our
essence being the final act or fulfillment.4 Aristotle says, "What grows
qua growing grows from something into something. Into what then
does it grow? Not into that from which it arose but into that to which it
tends. The shape then is nature. '49 Nature, then, is the form and the
ordered tendency; further, it is the end and final value.5 0
43. Id
44. Id Physics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 365 (footnote omitted).
45. Id Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 34, 940.
46. Id at 935 (footnote omitted).
47. Id Metaphysics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supralnote 20, at 830.
48. WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES, supra note 28, at 164-65.
49. McKeon, Physics, in THE BASIC WORKS, supra note 20, at 238.
50. Id at 239.
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Aristotle's conclusions constitute a theory of Natural Law which is
fundamental in all his works.
Property as Considered by the Greeks
Plato, in the Republic, advocates only to a small extent common
ownership of property." He urges that articles required for daily use be
retained by the guardians, those who qualified as philosopher-kings,
and owned by them in common. However, all real property is by no
means to belong to them. Rather it shall be owned by members of the
third estate (agriculturists) and be held by them individually, rather
than in common.
The reason that the guardians cannot own but must, in common,
renounce property is that their private economic interests might com-
pete with those of the subjects. If, however, such interests are nonexis-
tent, so also is the motive for abuse of their power. Consequently, they
are enabled to use this power in the interest of the commonwealth.
Plato endows members of the third estate with both property and
families, although these are subject to strict government supervision.
So, also, are trade and industry. And each member of the economic
class is assigned his specific work in order to prevent dissension. Such
constraints, moreover, assure that producers will never become either
rich or poor.-2
The concept of property also figures in Aristotle's Politics.3 Here,
ownership is justifiable in terms of the ideal. Private property is a good,
so long as it subserves the moral end. Property, therefore, is not to be
merely retained but to be retained when it has been "improved and
perfected by proper customs and legislation regulating its use."54 Such
customs and legislation will assure that private property is an instru-
ment for moral purposes. In this manner, therefore, property becomes
public as well as private, and common as well as individual. In effect,
Aristotle's formula provides for both private possession and common
use.5 5 But does this constitute a defense of the right to private property?
Whatever Aristotle's defense of private property may be, his con-
clusion is consistent with that noted above; for the theory of the state
51. Jowett, Plato, supra note 21, at 464, 726.
52. M. FOSTER, I MASTERS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 77-84 (1941); BARKER, POLITICAL THE-
ORY, supra note 23, at 140-41.
53. BARKER, THE POLITICS, supra note 22, at 48-68.
54. Id.
55. BARKER, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 379-82.
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has not changed, and egoistic philosophy does not exist where private
property is defined within a context of moral public use.
C. Stoic (Roman) Ideas
In the history of political philosophy, the death of Aristotle (322
B.C.) marks the end of an era. And the failure of the city-state creates a
serious hiatus in the history of political theory. The ideals of the city-
state, as understood in Plato and Aristotle, were totally inapplicable a
generation later.
In effect, it became necessary that the individual learn a new way
of life, one never before experienced. This required him to live together
with his fellows in a new kind of social order, one much larger and
more impersonal than that of the old city-state. The ramifications of
this new orientation were extensive. To realize its extent, one need only
consider the fragmentation of religion that took place at this time, a
phenomenon culminating in a "universal"' i.e., catholic, church.
The psychological dimensions of this religious growth are gener-
ally understood in terms of the trauma of the individual confronted
with the fact of his individuality and bereft of any real socio-political
identity. Accordingly, he developed a self-consciousness, a sense of per-
sonal privacy and internality, of which the classical Greeks had never
conceived. He began to develop a sense of selfhood and of personal
responsibility, the like of which his ancestors had not known.
A major consequence of his adjusting to his new role was the dis-
solution of hitherto close ties between the individual and the polls, or
city-state entity. This adjustment was facilitated in some degree by the
emergence of a philosophy which interpreted social relations in differ-
ent terms. Whereas the ancient Greek was identified (by himself and
others) in terms of the polls, the decline of the city-state entity required
him to identify himself with his fellow beings generally, in terms of a
common human nature.
This sense of a common human nature brought to man, in general,
two new ideas. The first was that of his relationship with all others of
his kind, and his place within a community, a brotherhood of fellow
beings. The second was the idea of his personal and individual nature,
the paradox of his having at once a public and a private identity.
It was at this point that Stoic philosophy became identified with
the problems of the paradox.
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Natural Law According to the Stoics
The Stoics derived many of their ideas from Heraclitus, the pre-
Socratic philosopher who was a strong exponent of a Logos, the con-
cept of a rational principle common to all things and permeating the
entire universe. 56 The material principle of the Logos is fire, since this
represents the purest incidence of matter, the vehicle for soul and mind.
Such fire, however, is not the visible flame but rather is invisible
vapour.57 The concept of the Logos is intimately connected with ideas
fundamental in Heraclitus' interpretation of the world. These precepts
can be expressed in three general statements: (a) everything exists in
continuous motion and change; (b) the world is a living and everlasting
fire; and (c) harmony is always the product of opposites, thus strife is
the basic fact of the natural world. 8
Of these three ideas, the Stoics put relatively little emphasis on
unity of opposition. But they stressed heavily the concept of Logos, and
Zeno adopted fire as the basis of Stoic physics. "Above all the Stoics
systematically developed the linguistic and logical implications of a
universe directed by Logos." '59
In addition to the Logos concept, the Greek physis (the idea of
nature) was important in Stoic thought. In Stoic thought the term con-
notes the power which shapes things, i.e., fiery breath, self-moving and
generative, necessity and destiny, God, providence, craftsmanship and
right reason. Nature is that which holds the world together and that
which causes things to grow. Further, it is not only a physical power
but also a rational force. Thus God is the supreme rational being who
directs all events and purposes that are necessarily good. While nature
is equivalent to Logos in one sense (since it is present in all things), in
another sense, the rational principle (Logos), a naturalfaculy, belongs
to man alone.6°
The Roman acceptance of Stoic philosophy led to its application
in their legal system. Their common system of law ('us gentium) was a
distillation of various local laws. But the laws of their conquered neigh-
bors ('us naturale) were distinguished from those of their own common
system. Stoicism, however, taught that laws would be the same every-
56. G. KIRK & J. RAVEN, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS: A CRITICAL HISTORY WITH A
SELECTION OF TEXTS 182-215 (1957); A. LONG, HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY (1974) [hereinafter
cited as LONG, HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY].
57. W. GUTHRIE, 1 A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 432 (1962).
58. Id. at 435.
59. LONG, HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 56, at 146.
60. Id. at 148-49.
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where since all men were possessed of Logos. Accordingly, when Rome
discovered the similarities between its laws and those of others, the
logos and nature were assumed as the cause of the similarities.
In this way, the Roman Stoics' theory of the Natural Law evolved.
In effect, the distinction between the ideal law of Stoic philosophy and
the positive law of Rome (and its conquered states) vanished, and the
two were now seen as one. Cicero articulates the Roman Stoic's belief
in Natural Law in his famous treatise The Republic:.
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it sum-
mons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing
by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or
prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any
effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it
allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossi-
ble to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obliga-
tions by senate or people, and we need not look outside
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will
not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, of different laws
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law
will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be
one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the
author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge.61
Cicero emphasizes the human nature which all men hold in common
brotherhood. In effect, then, since all men are subject to one law and
are therefore fellow citizens, all men are equal under the law. And this
truth argues a proper respect for the dignity of humanity and a conse-
quent respect for each man as a member of the human brotherhood.
Therefore most theorists will agree that the Stoic concept of Natu-
ral Law encompasses the five principles basic in a general theory of
Natural Law:
(1) The world is an order of divergent tendencies which, on the
whole, support one another (Logos).
(2) Each individual entity is marked by an essential structure
which it shares in common with other members of the species (univer-
sal brotherhood).
(3) This structure determines certain basic existential tendencies
that are also common to the species (universal brotherhood).
61. Cicero, The Republic, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 133 (2d ed. W. Ebenstein, 1957).
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(4) These tendencies, to be realized without distortion and impedi-
ment must follow a general dynamic pattern. This pattern is known as
the Natural Law, and is grounded on real structure and enforced by
inexorable natural sanctions ('us gentium and jus naturale).
(5) Good and evil are existential categories. An entity existing in a
condition of active realization exists in a condition that is good; an en-
tity whose essential tendencies are impeded or distorted exists in a con-
dition that is evil. In the good condition, the Logos and reason are
present, whereas in the evil condition they are absent.
The Stoic State-Rights
The theory of the Roman state influenced by Stoic ideals and by
the Roman love of law suggests a state dependent upon law. For Cic-
ero, the Natural Law, common to all men and to God, and as old as
time, is also the source of the state itself.62 The state is a moral commu-
nity, a group of persons who possess in common the state and its law.
Thus it is a corporate body in which membership is the common pos-
session of all its citizens. Moreover, it exists for the express purpose of
serving its members. Three consequences follow from this:
(1) The authority of the state arises from the collective power of
its citizens. They are a self-governing organization. It possesses the
powers required to govern itself and to preserve its existence.
(2) When political power is rightfully and lawfully exercised, it is
without doubt the corporate power of the citizens. The public official
who exercises power does so because of his office. His warrant for this
is the law, and he is a creature of the law.
(3) The state and the law of the state are always subject to the
law of God (Logos), or the Natural Law (moral law)-that higher rule
of right which transcends human decisions and human organizations.
63
This theory of the state is far more dependent on law than is the
Greek theory. Moreover, it is based on a theory of rights with which the
Greeks were unacquainted.' Here, the state does not supersede the in-
dividual. The society and the state are not equivalent terms. The Stoic
62. "The political thought of Cicero is not important because of its originality... [tihey had
however one merit.. . everybody read them. An idea once embedded in Cicero was preserved to
the reading public for all future time." G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 161-62 (3d
ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY].
63. C. MCILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 116-18 (1932) [here-
inafter cited as MCILWAIN, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST]; SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY,
supra note 62, at 166-67.
64. MCILwAIN, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST, supra note 63, at 116.
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and Roman theorists speak of society as wider than a political unit and
regard man as
more than a mere "part" of a state, lifeless as a foot of stone if
separated from it, and even inconceivable but in reference to
it. Man may have a real existence before he enters into any
state, he has had an existence before states were or any of
their laws; and if so, it is possible to think of him as in some
ways independent of a state's existence, and it is conceivable
that he may have "rights" with which it has nothing to do.6"
Thus, for the first time in history, there appeared a theory of man
as an egocentric individual with rights gained from eternal law, a the-
ory developed by the Stoic philosophers and the practical bureaucrats
of Rome.
Property as Considered by the Stoics
In The Republic, Cicero suggests that the Natural Law would as-
sign property simply on the basis of the ability to use the property
well.66 Apparently, then, private property is acceptable, but only within
the context of the Natural Law. Under this condition, all individuals
have an equal right to property. Furthermore, it follows that the state
must protect this right. These ideas are the liberal principles of owner-
ship of property in the Roman state. Roman law demanded that owner-
ship be as unrestricted as possible. For the Roman, property right
included the "right to use" ('us utend), and the "right to draw fruit"
(usfruendi), as well as the "right to abuse" (lus abutendi).67
.D. The Middle Ages and St. Thomas Aquinas
When, in the course of the Roman Empire, Caesarism became a
permanent institution, the republic beloved of Cicero ceased forever" to
exist. No breath of the democratic spirit persisted sufficient to wither
the insidious growth of absolute power. Rather, the climate of the times
engendered a temperate acquiescence. Augustus, and the age he fa-
thered, inspired a general religious reformation. Both he and his suc-
cessors were considered as more or less "divine," and the allegiance he
(and others) received served to solidify the empire. This commonality
of adulation became a token and a symbol of an imperial unity. The
empire became, in effect, a politico-ecclesiastical institution, both
65. 1d. at 117.
66. Cicero, The Republic, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 147 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey
eds. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Strauss, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY].
67. G. DiETZE, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 14-15 (1963).
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church and state in one. In this sense it became a coherent society in-
fused with a common will. Accordingly, the common citizenship
granted to different peoples culminated in the edict of Caracalla (212
A.D.), whereby all free-born members of the empire were granted Ro-
man citizenship. And it was the development of a common law for the
empire which helped to promote the idea of common citizenship.
After the reign of Diocletian, fragmentation of the empire began.
The East fell away toward Byzantinism; the West moved into Latin
Christianity. The result of this disparity was a paradox of significant
proportions. For the East, which had brought religion and the Church
to the West, came under control of the state. And the West, which had
given politics and the state to the East, came under control of the
Church.
The Roman Empire, in its last days, was driven by self-preserva-
tion to adopt the religious creed as the only basis on which it could
continue to exist. The new religious temper of the times created an at-
mosphere in which the role of the Empire was that of a church. As
such, it survived in the West as a respublica Christiana, a Christian
commonwealth which recognized, in Constantine, the formal Byzan-
tine Succession. Gradually, however, it found a formal spiritual leader
of its own in the Bishop of Rome.
Medieval civilization was a single society, of which all were bap-
tized members and thereby knit together in a single fellowship. While
some members were merchants and artisans, the majority lived in
country villages, tied to the soil. This produced both a great uniformity
and a great isolation. The Church was the society's spirit, permeating
and unifying all its parts. Latin was the language of the Church and of
scholars, while the vernacular of the community was Romance or vul-
gar Latin. Thus the linguistic dimension of medieval civilization was
inherited from Rome. The universality of the Church was promulgated
and its singularity was emphasized with forceful intensity. All human
activity came within the province of the Church: education and learn-
ing, trade and commerce, war and peace, crime and punishment.
Under its aegis, the Civitas Del was to be built on earth.
The learning of the past was, therefore, to be brought within the
context of the City of God and adapted to its needs. And the heritage of
the pagan Hellenic world must be purified and transformed for this
purpose. It was Thomas d'Aquin who accomplished the merger of Hel-
lenic learning and Christian thought and thereby "wrought the greatest
miracle of genuine alchemy which is anywhere to be found in the an-
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The modem distinction between the Church and the state was un-
known to the Middle Ages, where both were one. Thus no conflict
could arise within a commonwealth where institutions were all mem-
bers of the same living body, a body infused with the Spirit of God
Himself.
The State as Considered in Medieval Times
The essence of Thomistic philosophy was that it propounded a
universal synthesis, an all-embracing system, the fundamental idea of
which was harmony.69 God and nature afford a place for the endless
diversity of finite life. Human knowledge, taken in its totality, is only
one single part. Each of the sciences is a part of this knowledge, and the
aim of philosophy is to formulate the universal ideas of all the sciences.
At the peak of the system stands Christian theology which is above
reason and is dependent upon divine revelation. But even though di-
vine, revelation is above reason, it is not contrary to reason. Theology
pulls together the entire system, giving it fulfillment and completion.
Thus, faith is that which fulfills reason; and faith and reason combine
to create the structure of knowledge.
In the universe of St. Thomas, God is at the pinnacle of a hierar-
chy that, in a descending order, includes the lowest being. The internal
nature of each creature urges it to seek the good, i.e., that form of
perfection which is natural to its kind. Even the lowest of creatures has
its station and duties whereby it contributes to the whole. In this struc-
ture man alone is unique; for although he has an animal body, his ra-
tional and spiritual soul make him related to God.7 °
Like Aristotle, St. Thomas saw society as consisting of a mutual
exchange of services all aiming toward the good life. The farmer, the
artisan, the priest-all contribute services to this end. Thus each class
does its own work. The good of all requires that each member of this
body has a principal role, even as higher parts of any body rule the
lower. All that man does on earth, the building of cities, the creation of
universities, the establishing of markets and ruling states, all represent
God's action, by which He makes and rules the world.
68. E. BARKER, CHURCH, STATE, AND STUDY; ESSAYS 59 (1930).
69. H. MEYER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 417-54 (F. Eckholt trans. 1944)
[hereinafter cited as MEYER, THE PHILOSOPHY].
70. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in 1 BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 682-863
(A. Pegis ed. 1944).
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Thus earthly rulers are the advocates and servants of the Lord. His
trust in them is evidence of their own trustworthiness, and this is their
justification as rulers of men's actions. Thus, like all other men, the
ruler makes his contribution to the common goal. For the power he
wields derives from God, and he must use it in the interests of that
good. Government action, then, must be rooted in the moral purpose of
governing.
Every ruler, therefore, must so govern as to enable each man in
every class to realize a virtuous and happy life. For this will fulfill the
true purpose of society; and
it is the function of the earthly ruler to lay the foundations of
human happiness by maintaining peace and order, to preserve
it by seeing that all the needful services of public administra-
tion, of juricature, and of defense are performed, and to im-
prove it by correcting abuses wherever they occur and by
removing all possible hindrances to the good life."'
Since rule exists for a moral purpose, the implication seems to be
that authority should be limited and exercised in accord with the law.
While Thomas maintained that true government is lawful, he made no
attempt to define lawful authority. Respecting the problem of tyrants,
he mentions two remedies to be used against them: Where government
authority derives from the people, it is their legal right to enforce the
conditions upon which authority is given. Where the ruler has a politi-
cal superior, it is the obligation of the aggrieved to appeal to the supe-
rior.
Thomas does not speak specifically of rights of an individual be-
cause the individual is a part of an organic whole ruled by a ruler who
is ruled by God. The ruler is a trustee who looks after those in his care
and leads them to the ultimate end of the good life. Hans Meyer says
that in the Thomistic system, man is
by nature a member of the community, and. . . is related to
the community as a part is to the whole, and as the imperfect
to the perfect . . . As the whole, the community possesses a
higher being; and as the perfect entity, it possesses a higher
value. This particular specific value of the community is the
common good, which is better and more divine than the good of
the individual. St. Thomas frequently brings into relief the Ar-
istotelian thought that the organic community excels the indi-
71. SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 250.
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vidual member and the particular good.72
Natural Law as Considered in Medieval Times
St. Thomas, like most medieval thinkers, was deeply influenced by
the traditional notion of the sanctity of the law. He revered the law and
assumed that it was not of human invention, but implanted in man by
divine power. His effort was always to relate, to the widest possible
extent, the human to the divine law. Human law, however, was only
one aspect of the cosmic fact. Divine law, emanating literally from
God's reason, governed the relationships among all living things.
In the Summa, St. Thomas establishes a complete theory of law.7"
The theory posits four levels of cosmic reality, which are four kinds of
law: Eternal Law, Natural Law, Divine Law, and Human Law. In ef-
fect, these constitute four forms of reason combined in one reason.
Eternal Law is that reason which is identical with God, the overall
plan, the perfect reason, the divine wisdom in which all of creation
gains order. Being reason, it is not alien to man's reason, but it is unat-
tainable to him and beyond his comprehension. As far as nature per-
mits, man is able to participate in the eternal wisdom and goodness of
God; yet he is unable to participate directly, for man is not God and
cannot comprehend this eternal law. As St. Thomas says: "Although
each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity. . . yet
none can comprehend it. .. .
Natural Law is the reflection of divine reason in created things and
is evident in the inclination implanted by nature in all beings. The in-
clination is to do and promote good and to avoid evil; to seek preserva-
tion of his own being, to provide education of offspring, and to live as
perfectly as possible in accordance with natural endowments. For man-
kind, the inclination is "to know the truth about God, and to live in
society. . . to shun ignorance. ' 75 In effect, it is the inclination to seek a
life in which the rational nature may be realized.
Divine Law, says St. Thomas, is substantially revelation, for exam-
ple, the Ten Commandments; or, it is other legislation given by God
through scripture or the Church. Divine Law is a gift of God's grace,
not a discovery of natural reason. It is important to notice that St.
Thomas does not allow Divine Law to eclipse Natural Law. Revelation
72. MEYER, THE PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 441.
73. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 742-852
(A. Pegis ed. 1944) [hereinafter cited as Pegis, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS].
74. Id at 764.
75. Id. at 775.
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is an addition to reason, but it does not negate it or nullify it. The
structure that Thomas builds is basic and dependent upon reason and
faith; thus Divine Law is only a part of that structure.76
The three parts of the structure, Eternal, Natural, and Divine
Laws, all define criteria for behavior but are not applicable always and
exclusively only to men.
Human Law is that applicable only to human beings. It is divided
into jus gent/um and jus civile and since man's rationality distinguishes
him from other beings, the standard is set by reason.77 The mean is that
of the general good rather than that of particular advantage. 78 To St.
Thomas, promulgation was essential to law. Thus he completes his
definition of law by saying that law is an "ordinance of reason for the
common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the communi-
ty."
79
In this fourfold classification of the law, it is obvious that Natural
Law is the fundamental principle. Thomas's thesis is that Human Law
is derived from Natural Law. The inherent principle of Human Law,
and the regulation and enforcement by which it is realized is tied to the
rational nature of man. And reason moves implicitly toward rightness
and goodness. Human Law, then, is but a corollary of Natural Law.
And Natural Law need only be realized in human terms for its rele-
vance in the human sphere to be seen. For example, in the Natural
Law, murder is clearly a contrary, since it is alien to peace and order.
But Natural Law gives only a general definition of murder and posits
no particular penalty for it. Murder is wrong by reason of its being
opposed to the logos. But the retribution required of the murderer is a
question of human policy, which will vary in accordance with time,
place, and circumstance. The principle here is immutable, because the
fact of human rationality is immutable. Man's fundamental inclina-
tions remain always the same, despite the various ways and means he
finds for realizing them. The state and its governance change inces-
santly but always there is one right, one law and one justice.80
The ruler (preferably a monarch, in Aquinas) is always bound by
reason and justice, since his power over the positive law arises from
76. Pegis, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 752-55; MEYER, THE PHILOSOPHY, supra
note 69, at 506-11.
77. Pegis, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 743.
78. Id. at 744-45.
79. Id. at 747.
80. MCILWAIN, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST, supra note 63, at 333-35; MEYER, THE
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 69, at 500-11.
1978]
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JO URAAL
maintaining an agreement with Human Law and Natural Law. Thus,
St. Thomas sought to justify, in terms of human reason, the Christian
Society that he thought was eternal by constructing "a rational scheme
of God, nature, and man within which society and civil authority find
their due place."'"
The Thomistic system, therefore, upholds the supreme authority of
the Church in the organic society of the Middle Ages. It also gives to
the Emperor his due share. But the Eternal Law of God is paramount
and, as both Natural and Divine Law, it is the basis for all law. It fol-
lows, therefore, that all human laws must be just, since they derive
from the Natural and Divine Laws.
Thus, the Theory of Natural Law is evident in Aquinas, for his
argument supports its five elemental theses:
(1) The world is an order of divergent tendencies which on the
whole support one another (Eternal Law).
(2) Each individual entity is marked by an essential structure
which it shares in common with other members of the species (Natural
Law).
(3) This structure determines certain essential tendencies com-
mon to the species (Natural Law).
(4) To be realized, these tendencies must follow, without distor-
tion or frustration, a general dynamic pattern which is the Natural
Law, a law grounded on real structure and enforced by inexorable nat-
ural sanctions (Natural Law).
(5) Good and evil are existential categories. An entity existing in
a condition of active realization exists in a condition that is good; an
entity whose essential tendencies are impeded or distorted exists in a
condition that is evil. In the good condition, the Logos and reason are
present, whereas in the evil condition they are absent (Human Law).
Property as Considered in Medieval Times
Respecting the right of property, Thomas stands somewhere be-
tween the Church's rejection of private property and the Lockean ele-
vation of property to a natural right.8 2 St. Thomas comments upon
private property (and the power to possess it) in these words:
81. SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 257.
82. Two long analyses of Thomistic theory of property are included in: McDonald, The Social
Value of Properly According to Thomas Aquinas, in 58 CATH. U. OF AMERICA PHILOSOPHICAL
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First because every man is more careful to procure what
is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to
all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another
that which concerns the community, as happens where there
is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human af-
fairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is
charged with taking care of some particular thing himself,
whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look af-
ter any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more
peaceful state is ensued to man if each one is contented with
his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more
frequently when there is no division of the things possessed.83
But he maintains that the use of things must be for the common good
rather than for individual gain. He recognizes the difference between
rich and poor with his awareness of the inequities that are liable to
occur when open property allows some people to possess more than
others. This situation, however, can be acceptable so long as some
share goes to each. But the exclusion of everyone from property is un-
lawful. Thomas's distinction derives from the difference between the
Natural Law and the Human Law. Regulation of the right to property
is a part of the state's function. Thus, as Professor Friedman says,
"There is no foundation whatsoever, in St. Thomas's teaching, for the
elevation of the right of private property into a principle of natural
law."84 Friedman goes on to emphasize that scholastic doctrine was
amended in the late nineteenth century to give credence to private
property as a principle of Natural Law. But such thinking is clearly not
derived from Thomistic thought.8 5
The problem for St. Thomas is clear: Society is an organic one
ruled by the Church and God; despite that fact, though, those who
work the land desire to own that which they labor over. For Thomas,
this fact created a dilemma. But its clear resolution must be that the
land, whether or not certain aspects of ownership were allowed, was
subject to the will of the organic society. The good of the whole was
paramount. Therefore, private property owned by egocentric individu-
als was unthinkable in an organic society. In the last analysis, the di-
lemma was resolved for St. Thomas as it had been for Aristotle. For the
individual was a part of the society, and generally never considered
83. Pegis, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 73, at 508.
84. W. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 111 (5th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN, LEGAL
THEORY].
85. Id at 108-12.
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thinking in egoistic terms. The Reverend William J. McDonald, com-
menting on the Thomistic theory of property, rightly concludes that
"The Thomistic concept of property is dominantly ethical. It avoids the
extremes of selfish possession and violent dispossession. Its aim is so-
cialized private property."8 6
E. The Eighteenth Century. John Locke's Theory
The Renaissance is a historical epoch that defies easy characteriza-
tion. 7 Generally, it was a transitional period between the Middle Ages
and modem times. But the transition was not accomplished by promul-
gation of definite theories or firmly established values. Rather, it is
manifested in significant shifts of emphasis. The central fact of this
transition is that traditional medieval ideas no longer sufficed as the
apologia for existence. Men therefore sought to understand themselves
without recourse to God or to an organic world view. The concept of
values peculiarly secular arose; and, concomitantly, the peculiar value
of the individual was noticed. Man's ultimate discovery of himself was
inevitable. And such thinkers as Erasmus became exponents of the new
humanism, a theory suggesting that man's own worldly purposes might
be distinguished from, and independent of, traditional theological con-
ceptions.
Thus arose a new consciousness of man's unique and tragic posi-
tion as he faced an expanding cosmos. In no other epoch was the ad-
monition "know thyself' so idealized as the goal of life. Nevertheless,
means for achieving the ideal were often derived from earlier humanis-
tic philosophies, especially those of Hellenic origin.
Renaissance man lived, in effect, between two worlds: that of the
Christian Middle Ages and that of secular scientific knowledge. In the
one, the significance of every phenomenon was pre-determined by a
priori definitions. In the other, the phenomena resisted systematic
codification in terms of given scientific concepts and social principles.
In effect, then, he was suspended between faith and knowledge. 88
86. McDonald, Social Value, supra note 82, at 185.
87. H. MULLER, FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN WORLD: FROM THE DARK AGES TO THE RISE
OF DEMOCRACY 106-10, 314-48 (1963) [hereinafter cited as MULLER, WESTERN WORLD].
88. An important transitional figure between Aquinas and Locke is Richard Hooker (1593-
1662), the Anglican divine and Oxford fellow, whose massive treatise, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESI-
ASTICAL POLITY (1969), sought to modify the literality of Puritan extremism in terms of the value
of human reason and the Natural Law. See E. DAVIES, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF RICHARD
HOOKER (1946); P. MUNz, THE PLACE OF HOOKER IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT (1952); F.
SHIRLEY, RICHARD HOOKER AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEAS (1949); Strauss, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 66, at 330-39.
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Central in the Age of Enlightenment was the conviction that
human understanding is capable, by its own power and without re-
course to supernatural assistance, of comprehending the system of the
world. The Enlightenment is best characterized in Kant's definition:
Enlightenment is the liberation of man from his self-in--
curred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his
understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred
is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in
lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from
another. Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own rea-
son!'-that is the motto of enlightenment.89
From this conviction grew man's faith in his ultimate ability to master
his world.
The modern conception of natural science begins at this point, and
the spirit of Galileo permeates the age of Kepler. Fundamental is the
notion of nature as a closed system of causes and effects, of reasons and
implications. In Leibnitz's hypothesis, nothing is accidental or arbi-
trary; but everything is ruled by universal or necessary laws. These
laws, however, are not derivable from mere sense experience but by a
conceptual analysis of natural phenomena. Galileo's first results had
been reached by such analysis. And Descartes confirmed and enlarged
this theory by the discovery of analytical geometry. So also did
Leibnitz with his analysis of the infinite, and Newton in his discovery
of a calculus of fluxions.
But it remained to establish the significance of the new concep-
tions in terms of universal laws, since the being of man was assumed to
be implied by and subordinate to the being of nature. Whereas the me-
dieval view had been spiritualistic, the Enlightenment view was materi-
alistic. Hobbes's Leviathan9" was an attempt to justify the transition
from the one view to the other, a task not undertaken by Locke in his
political theory.
The organic concept of the state was supplanted by the mechanis-
tic one on the basis of two vital assumptions. One held that all social
organization is based on the explicit consent of the associates, or on a
social contract. It originates in restrictions accepted voluntarily by indi-
viduals. A second assumption was that by contracting among them-
selves to act in unity, individuals transcend the state of nature. Thus, by
89. Kant, *hat is Enlightenment?fBeurtiworfung der Frage." Was IstAuklarung?] in ON His-
TORY 3 (L. Beck. R. Anchor, & E. Fackenheim trans. 1963).
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the theory of natural rights, individuals (singi) are transformed into
the universitatus, or the manifestation of the common will.
Basic Theory of John Locke
Locke interprets Natural Law as the claim of each individual to
innate, indefeasible rights. Embraced within these rights came private
property. This theory, consequently, was as egoistic as that of Hobbes,
inasmuch as the government and society existed only to preserve the
individual's rights. The limitation on the authority of government and
society was based on the indefeasibility of such rights.
Locke's Theory of the Natural Right to Propery
Locke holds that the state of nature is one of "peace, good will and
mutual assistance and preservation." He defends this position on
grounds that the law of nature provides an outline of human rights and
duties unique to nature. But the state of nature lacks organization and
written law by which the rules of right can be actualized in the social
milieu. Since whatever is right or wrong is that way eternally, positive
law provides only a means of enforcing rather than amending the ethi-
cal quality of human conduct.
Locke, like the medieval philosophers, considered good govern-
ment as expedient in human affairs. Good government was that which
recognizes the primacy and the immutability of certain moral rights
and duties. Moreover, neither a national tradition nor a divine law nec-
essarily provided such a government; rather it must be derived from a
social contract or agreement between the body politic and the ruling
authority. Locke's position thus places him clearly among exponents of
the law of nature; and his advocacy of constitutionalism is reinforced
by the arguments of Natural Law.
Locke's insistence upon man's native moral sense led him to con-
clude that the right to private property was among the natural rights of
men. If this is so, then it is neither the duty nor the prerogative of social
governments to deprive men of this right. For if government is not the
source of the right to property, then government is not possessed of the
power to deny that right. On the contrary, it is the duty of both society
and government to protect the right to property. For a natural right
(such as property) takes precedence over any principles that may obtain
in the arbitrary socio-political practices of men.
Locke's reliance on the theory of Natural Law leads to his conse-
quent definition of "life, liberty, and estate" as rights natural to man.
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This definition, moreover, is greatly significant to his conception of the
nature and function of government. For if the responsibility of govern-
ment is to guard and to provide for man's exercise of his natural rights,
then a special kind of government is required. It must be one that regu-
lates man's rights (e.g., property) only for the purpose and to the extent
of providing for equity in the exercise of all those rights. Simply stated,
one person's "life, liberty, and estate" may be limited only to protect
the equally valid and just claims of some other person who has the
same rights.
Locke's Theory of The Social Contract
Locke defined civil power as "a right of making laws, with penal-
ties. . . for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employ-
ing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws,. . . all
this only for the public good."' I Such a power, however, can arise only
from the consent of those whose rights are regulated by it. Moreover,
since it is to regulate all individuals, it must proceed from the acquies-
cence of each individual, according to his natural right to protect him-
self and his property.
Thus both the legislative and executive powers of government ac-
tually represent the particular power of the individual "resigned to the
public." This situation is justifiable because, while his rights are inher-
ent, man's ability to exercise these can be weakened or impeded by
various forces to which he is subjected. The "original compact" in
which all men "incorporate into one society" is a bare agreement "to
unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs
be, between the individuals, that enter into or make up a common-
wealth."92
Thus the two parts of Locke's theory unite in his hypothesis that
an agreement of a majority of the members constitutes an act of the
community. Accordingly, the consent by which each person agrees with
others to form a body politic obligates each to submit to majority rule.
Effectively, then, agreement of the majority is agreement of the entire
society.
Locke's Theory of Society and Government
In general, Locke regards the setting up of government as less
meaningful than the original social compact creating a civil society.
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Once the majority has acquiesced to the government as realized, then
the entire power of the community is vested in them. The particular
form of government depends upon how the community delegates or
disposes of its power. Locke envisioned the legislative as the supreme
power, while regarding the executive as sharing in its processes. What
is plain, however, is that the powers of both are limited. A legislature
cannot, for example, arbitrarily interfere in matters of property without
consent (i.e., majority rule); nor can it delegate its powers, since these
were given to it alone for exercise in the interests of the delegators.
Essentially, the legislative power is a fiduciary one and the people can
change or curb it if the legislature acts outside the power. Limitations
of executive power derive from its dependence upon the legislative.
The relationship of these two powers is assured by their definition as
separate bodies.
At the end of his second treatise, Locke examines the right of the
people to resist tyranny. Again, his assumption that moral truths are
immutable and primary produces a conclusion: force cannot create nor
maintain these truths. Accordingly, a government erected through force
is justifiable only when it proceeds to recognize the inherent presence of
natural rights in the community. Then, despite its origin through force,
it will evolve in harmony with the Natural Law (i.e., moral order),
thereby becoming a part of that order. On this point, Locke's notion is
very similar to that of Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Thomas.
Dissolution of government, according to Locke's theory, can occur
in either of two ways. One involves a change in the location of legisla-
tive power; the other results from government's abuse of the power en-
trusted to it. Should the legislature, for example, invade life, liberty, or
property rights, it thereby forfeits its powers. In his persistent emphasis
on the unlawful acts of legislatures, Locke continues to equate that
which is unlawful with violations of the Natural Law or moral law.
Discussion of Locke's Natural Law and Property
The major theme of John Locke's political theory is plainly de-
rived from the idea of Natural Law. And while the concept is not
openly argued, it seeps into and through every principle of his theory.
Yet John Locke wrote An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,93
in which he postulates the empiricist ideas of knowledge. Conse-
quently, he is accused of being inconsistent because he emphasizes, on
one hand, the empirical theory of knowledge and, on the other hand,
93. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1853).
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propounds the rationalist theory of natural law in his political works.
The explanation is that Locke was an Enlightenment thinker who was
influenced, like most others of the time, by the two major theories of
knowledge that were not considered mutually exclusive but comple-
mentary. Thus, it was perfectly appropriate for him to theorize in two
different disciplines (political science and philosophy), employing dif-
ferent, but complementary, theories of knowledge. As Overton Taylor
says:
[E]ighteenth-century minds could thus blend, without any
sense of being inconsistent, tendencies toward the contrary
'methods' of allout 'rationalism' and full-fledged 'empiricism,'
because in and for that age the appeals to 'reason' and to 'ex-
perience' were in the main not rivals but allies, in the general,
common opposition to all uncritical, reverent acceptance of
views supported by tradition and authority.94
Moreover, many maintain that such a strong empiricist thinker
could not have seriously supported Natural Law thinking, and thus
Locke did not really mean what he said in the political essays. W. von
Leyden, in newly discovered writings of John Locke, shows that in one
of two early unpublished Treatises on the Civil Magistrate, Locke sup-
ports one of his proofs using the Natural Law rationalist arguments.95
Further, and far more important, there is ample evidence that the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding was unfinished, and the unpub-
lished essays on Natural Law were intended to be the groundwork for
completing the Essay, with a discussion of the theory of rationalist
knowledge. Says von Leyden: "His intention, obviously, was to con-
tinue his investigation on a more comprehensive scale so as to be able
to introduce into it the relevant material contained in his essays." 96
Therefore, the presence of the unpublished essays, their relation-
ship to the Essay on reasoning, and the general context of Locke's work
provide evidence for the theory of Natural Law as the basis of his polit-
ical theory. At the very least, the evidence for this assertion is clear and
available? 7
94. 0. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: SOCIAL IDEALS AND ECONOMIC THEO-
RIES FROM QUESNAY TO KEYNES 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited as TAYLOR, QUESNAY To KEYNES];
M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 5 (2d
ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as COHEN, REASON AND NATURE].
95. J. LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 27 (W. von Leyden ed. 1970).
96. Id. at 62.
97. See also C. CAZJKOWSKI, THE THEORY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN JOHN LOCKE'S POLITI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 43-46 (1941); J. DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE 187-99 (1969)
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Comparison of Locke's Ideas and Those of St. Thomas
In comparing the ideas of Locke and Aquinas, it is interesting to
note that, with each man, the notion of right order is based on a differ-
ent conception of the causal relations between subject and object. In
Thomas, "the subject is determined to the objective good as his end."
With Locke, on the other hand, "the objective good is determined to
the subject as its end." And it is a difference in values which places one
idea in contrast to the other. Paul M. Downing observes that "the ulti-
mate value recognized by St. Thomas is being, while the ultimate value
recognized by Locke is the productive agency of the individual. The
Thomistic conception of order is determinate or rational; the Lockean
conception,. . . is indeterminate (within the bounds of the law of na-
ture), since it is subjective."98 Downing also notes that St. Thomas
posits a teleological right order which requires that "the authority exer-
cise determination for the sake of that objective good of order which is
common."99 Locke, however, argues effectively against the exercise of
authority as an objective principle of society: "Authority is admitted
only as a convenient evil."' 1
George Sabine says of John Locke and his theories: "His sincerity,
his profound moral conviction, his genuine belief in liberty, in human
rights, and in the dignity of human nature, united with his moderation
and good sense, made him the ideal spokesman of a middle-class
revolution."10 1
III. FREEDOM AND NATURE-Two MAJOR THEMES IN
CLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY
There is general agreement among scholars of Classical Economic
Theory that its two central themes are those of freedom and of nature.
Overton Taylor, speaking of Adam Smith, founder of the Classical
Theory, illustrates this fact:
Smith's great economic treatise contains both his 'preach-
ing' of his 'gospel' of economic liberalism, i.e., economic free-
dom for all individuals, and his 'scientific' theory or account
(general description and explanation) of the operating
processes of the economic systems of (nation) societies, and
the effects upon those processes and their results of the ways
98. P. Downing, A Comparison of the Doctrines ofSt. ThomasAquinas and John Locke on the
Right of PoliticalAuthority 141-42 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id
101. SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 540.
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and degrees in which the societies do or/and do not accept
and realize the liberal ideal in developing their institutions
and public policies. And these two parts-the ethical-norma-
tive and the positive-scientific (descriptive-explanatory)
parts-of the book's total message are partly interdependent
or bound together, and yet are largely independent of each
other. . .. His ethical-and-economic ideal vision of 'the sys-
tem of natural liberty' for all individuals seemed to him to be
in a sense implicit or potential in the 'nature' of the universe
and of mankind, and to have much real power and a 'ten-
dency' to get itself approximately realized, through the work-
ing out of men's 'natural' propensities and uses of their
intelligence, experience, and growing knowledge .... 102
Not only are the themes of freedom and nature found in Smith,
but they also permeate the work of all Classical Theorists. As one of the
most renowned biographers and researchers of Classical Theory, Lio-
nel Robbins, observes
there can be no doubt that the English Classical Economists
regarded their system as something vastly superior in its im-
plications for human happiness than the systems of restraint
and regulation which then prevailed. We do not get these men
in their proper historical setting unless we realize that, in the
context of their day at least, they were reformers. The System
of Economic Freedom was not just a detached recommenda-
tion not to interfere: it was an urgent demand that what were
thought to be hampering and anti-social impediments should
be removed and that the immense potential of free pioneering
individual initiative should be released.10 3
Further, in speaking of nature, Robbins says,
It is certainly true that the Classical analysis is teleological in
the sense that, like all analysis of conduct, it runs in terms of
purpose. . . . They believed that, in a world of free enter-
prise, certain relationships would arise which were of a mutu-
ally advantageous kind to the individuals concerned and
superior to those resulting from alternative systems. .... 104
It is apparent, then, that the two ideas of freedom and nature are
indigenous to the Classical Model.
102. TAYLOP, QUESNAY To KEYNES, supra note 94, at 78-79.
103. ROBBINS, ENGLISH CLASSICAL, supra note 4, at 19.
104. Id. at 28-29.
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The concepts of property and liberty have been inseparable, par-
ticularly since Locke, in whose theory property was indeed the source
of the most important of liberties. In effect, Locke's discussion of prop-
erty was his presentation of liberty. Up to now our discussion has em-
phasized the distinction to be understood between the notion of
freedom in the ancient and in the modem world. Clearly, the Greeks
must be considered the inventors of the idea of freedom and were
themselves the first free men. Herbert J. Muller pays special attention
to the nature of Greek society and the uniqueness of its character.'
The failure of Greek society has been revealed as resulting from an
absence of certain vital elements which were developed by succeeding
cultures. The Greek society lacked the legal element which the Roman
Stoics developed; it lacked the moral one which was developed in the
Middle Ages; and it lacked the institutions necessary to safeguard the
inherent instability of such a society. Those safeguards were developed
by both Roman and British legal bureaucracies."0 6
By the eighteenth century it was possible to perceive and to resolve
these problems of society. Locke's Two Treatises of Ciil Government"0 7
were the apogee of the theory of freedom. And, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the concept of freedom was further defined by John Stuart Mill,
the last of the Classical Economic Theorists. Mill's essay, On
Liberty,' 8 is perhaps the most famous ever written on the subject of the
free man in a free society. In the main, it offers four principles indige-
nous to the idea of freedom. One of these is that the moral responsibil-
ity native to men requires that each man be treated with the dignity
appropriate to his nature as a responsible being. Another is the accept-
ance of political and social freedom as a good in itself, since freedom is
the proper condition of a responsible being. The good society is thus
one which allows to every man not only freedom but also opportunity
for the good life. A third principle holds that liberty is a social as well
as an individual good; for if a free idea is silenced by force, this does
violence not only to him who holds it but also to the community which
is thereby denied any advantage to have been gained from free criti-
cism of the idea. Finally, Mill insists that the function of a free society
105. H. MULLER, FREEDOM IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 145-94 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
MULLER, ANCIENT WORLD].
106. Id See also MULLER, WESTERN WORLD, supra note 87, at 106.
107. LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 15.
108. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY: ANNOTATED TExT, SOURCES AND BACKGROUND CRITICISM (D.
Spitz ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MILL, ON LIBERTY].
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is positive rather than negative; for the presence of legislation allows
for the creation, the increase, and the equalization of opportunities to
all. Accordingly, its limits are defined in terms of its capacities to ex-
tend conditions of opportunity to all citizens, improving the quality of
life and lessening the chances of coercion.
The "inconsistencies" in Mill's thought (like those in Locke's) are
generally resolved by thorough study of his complete oevre, especially
if particular attention is paid to the position of a given work within the
context of the whole. 10 9
The centrality of the notion of liberty in classical economic
thought is summed up by Glenn R. Morrow: "Individual liberty, in
politics, in religion, in industry was felt to be the first and sometimes
the only thing necessary for the introduction of a better social and po-
litical order. . . ."I" It is, therefore, not surprising that the concept of
liberty is seminal in the works of Locke, Smith, Mill, and other expo-
nents of the Classical Economic Theory."' It is significant, also, that
the works of these three men remain today among the world's most
read, most valued, and most relevant treatises on liberty.
B. Nature
The concept of nature as a universal substance, idea, or rationality
is perhaps one of the oldest in human history. Those civilizations in
which this concept was fundamental accordingly developed societies
that were emblematic of it. Since Greek thought was the first systemati-
cally to conceive of reason, it is responsible for the notion that man's
relationship to the universe is both determined by and discovered in his
rational capacity. While Classical Economic Theory received the con-
cept of freedom through Locke, who, in turn, was indebted to Greek,
Roman, and medieval thought, clearly the idea is fundamental to En-
lightenment thinking generally, and particularly to the thought of
Smith and others. Thus, even without Locke's contribution, the idea of
liberty was given expression by many voices. Adam Smith, for exam-
109. SABINE, POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 62, at 714-15. See also MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra
note 108; Levi, The Value of Freedom: Mill's "Liberty,"in 70 ETHICS 37 (1959); R. Lichtman, The
Surface and Substance ofMill's Defense of Freedom, 30 Soc. RES. 469 (1963); Scanlan, J S. Mill
and the Deinition ofFreedom, in 68 ETHICS 194 (1958).
110. Morrow, Adam Smith: Moralist and Philosopher, in ADAM SMITH, 1776-1926: LECTURES
TO COMMEMORATE THE SESQUICENTENNIAL OF THE PUBLICATION OF "THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS" 161 (J. Clark, P. Douglas & J. Hollender eds. 1928) [hereinafter cited as Morrow, ADAM
SMITH].
111. The reader understands, of course, that Locke was not a Classical Economic Theorist,
but one followed by such theorists insofar as his theory pertained to liberty and property.
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ple, is supposed to have been greatly influenced by the ideas of his
mentor, Francis Hutcheson." 2
The convolutions of Enlightenment thinking on nature, the Natu-
ral Law, universal rationality, and so forth, cannot be explored here. It
is useful, however, to consider Glenn R. Morrow's remark about Adam
Smith. Observes Morrow, "Adam Smith not only represents self-inter-
est as the usual and most powerful motive in economic activity, but
[shows] that economic institutions arise naturally, i.e., spontaneously,
through the operation of this principle in human nature .... ,,113
Smith accepts unquestioningly a natural or rational social order. Thus
when the removal of social restrictions is accomplished, and, conse-
quently, conditions of natural liberty and free competition restored, the
natural order of society can be realized to the fullest extent. Smith con-
ceived of systems of preference and restraint as artificial impediments
to the natural liberty of men; thus, if these are removed altogether, the
essential system of natural liberty will establish itself of its own ac-
cord."' In effect, Smith's theory assumes the existence of an order or
power not created by but comprehendable through human reason. Ac-
cordingly, social and economic institutions must be manifestations of
this order, if they are not to thwart or impede man's realization of his
place in that order.
Smith speaks of this realization with appropriate awe: "The great,
the immense fabrick of human society, that fabrick which, to raise and
support, seems, in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar
and darling care of nature. . ." ' The self-interest of the individual
is, to Smith, his natural guide, inasmuch as it emanates from the invis-
ible, inherent rule of nature. As he writes in the Theory of Moral
Sentiment. "[Men] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
inhabitants; and thus, without intending it, without knowing it, ad-
vance the interest of society . .. 16
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith continues to speak of man in this
way, observing that "he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as
in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
112. TAYLOR, QUESNEY TO KEYNES, supra note 94, at 39-48; H. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF
ECONOMIC THOUGHT 228 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH].
113. Morrow, ADAM SMITH, supra note 110, at 164.
114. Id.
115. A. SMITH, 1 THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 115 (Boston, 1817).
116. Id at 249.
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was no part of his intention."' 17
This notion of the "invisible hand" is a manifestation of the eigh-
teenth-century faith in a Natural Law or order which operates accord-
ing to the principle of harmony and ultimate rationality of all things. In
Smith, this concept is fundamental to the argument of both the Theory
of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations.
Scholars generally do not hesitate to accept the presence of the
Natural Law concept in Adam Smith. Its place in the thinking of other
Classic Economic Theorists is, however, occasionally a subject for disa-
greement. Contention arises over the notion of the "invisible hand," as
this is understood by theorists less religiously inclined than Smith.
There is no reason to suppose, however, that Classical Theorists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries defined the "invisible hand" as the
hand of God. On the contrary, to many of them, the invisible guide was
the principle of ultimate rationality in all things; whether this principle
and a "prime mover" were one and the same was not the central issue
of the argument. This issue was, rather, the relation of social and eco-
nomic institutions to an underlying principle of natural order in all
things.
18
IV. PART II OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: FIRMS ARE MANAGED BY
OWNER-ENTREPRENEURS WHO AIM TO MAXIMIZE PROFITS
Giving the names of "entrepreneur" and "creative entrepreneur"
to classes of people hitherto unidentified as to their commercial species
and sub-species apparently occurred more than two hundred and fifty
years ago. "Entrepreneur" appears in the Dictionnaire de Commerce of
Jacques de Bruslons Savary as early as 1723. But aside from its pres-
ence in a lexicography of terms used in commerce, the word seems to
have had no specific meaning other than to describe a type of owner
familiar to business that need not be defined. Two years later, however,
"entrepreneur" becomes a defined term in Richard Cantillon's Essai
sur le Commerce. Cantillon applies it to that category of gainfully em-
ployed persons (such as farmers, tavern-keepers, wholesalers, retailers,
etc.) who buy at a certain price and sell at an uncertain one. Thus be-
gins the "risk-bearer" concept of the entrepreneur as one who is the
owner of an enterprise for uncertain profit.19
117. A. SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
423 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS].
118. ROBBINS, ENGLISH CLASSICAL, supra note 4, at 11.
119. Redlich, The Origins of the Concepts of "Entrepreneur"aid "Creative Entrepreneur, "in I
EXPLORATIONS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 1 (1949).
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The concept of the "creative entrepreneur" appears first in Daniel
Defoe's work, An Essay Upon Projects (1697). In the second chapter of
the book, Defoe uses the term "projector" to define one who "puts his
project in execution and contents himself with the real procedure of his
invention." Defoe's "projector" is thus the creative inventor, i.e., one
who undertakes or attempts a venture in the sense of entreprendre. In
the eighteenth century, Malachy Postlethwayt's Universal Dictionary of
Trade and Commerce uses the term "projector" in a sense approaching
the modem meaning of "creative entrepreneur." Postlethwayt also of-
fers quotations from Sprat's History of the Royal Society (1667) in
which the term "projector" appears. 120
The evidence suggests, then, that the concept of the "entrepre-
neur" was not altogether unfamiliar to eighteenth-century theorists.
A. The Entrepreneur-Turgot's and Smith's D§fnitions
By the eighteenth century, capital was becoming accepted as an
important factor in production and, relative to labor, began to occupy a
significant position vis-a-vis the business unit. In the absence of credit
facilities for the easy lending and borrowing of capital, businesses came
into the control of those already possessed of capital, thus joining to-
gether land and labor as a business unit. In this way, independent arti-
sans became laborers in factories. But business units per se were still
relatively small.
Originally, both ownership and cultivation of land were bound to-
gether; eventually, however, there were those who owned the land but
rented it to others for cultivation. In this way, they could live off the
land without the need to cultivate it themselves. Turgot calls such land-
owners a "disposable class," and the only social class "which, not being
bound by the need of subsistence to a particular labor, can be em-
ployed for the general needs of society."' 121
Jacques Turgot, the Physiocrat, pursues this idea further by distin-
guishing the ownership of capital as a separate economic function. 122
His rationale for this is his conception of the capitalist as one who may
either invest or lend his capital. The first is free to invest in either land
or business. Should he decide to purchase land, he is a capitalist land-
owner. But if he invests in goods required for his business, he is a capi-
talist and entrepreneur; as owner of the accumulated fund of value, he
120. Id.
121. Tuttle, The Entrepreneur in Economic Literature, 35 J. POL. ECON. 503 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as Tuttle, The Entrepreneul.
122. Id. Tuttle states that Turgot makes this analysis for the first time in economic history.
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is a capitalist, and as owner of the goods in which he invests, he is an
entrepreneur. If the capitalist prefers to lend (rather than to invest) his
funds, he remains simply a capitalist, since another person now uses the
capital for investment into goods.
From this distinction, it follows that the capitalist who becomes an
entrepreneur invests in all kinds of enterprises and may, thereby, em-
ploy many kinds of labor (e.g., commercial, agricultural, etc.). More-
over, says Turgot,
besides interest on his capital, [the entrepreneur gains] a profit
to recompense him for his care, his labor, his talents, and his
risks and to furnish him in addition with that wherewith he
may replace the annual wear and tear of his advances,-[sic]
which he is obliged to convert from the very first into effects
which are susceptible of change, and which are, moreover, ex-
posed to every kind of accident.12 3
Thus, for Turgot, the entrepreneur is necessarily a possessor of
capital; but the capitalist per se differs from the entrepreneur inasmuch
as the latter is an owner, and more important, an organizer and man-
ager, as well. Mere ownership of business, therefore, does not make an
entrepreneur. It is his organizational and management functions, i.e.,
the quality of his labor per se, that distinguish him from the mere capi-
talist.
In the works of Adam Smith, the term "entrepreneur" does not
appear, since the word "undertaker" was the current English term ap-
plied to one who undertook a business venture. And the function of the
undertaker is not discussed directly in The Wealth ofNations. Smith, in
fact, is regarded as having "sidetracked" the concept of capital found in
Turgot, for he discusses capital as an accumulated stock of goods, ex-
clusive of land.'2 4 In the words of Charles A. Tuttle: "Adam Smith's
failure. . . consciously to distinguish between capital and production
goods rendered it impossible for him to differentiate as Turgot had
done, the ownership of capital from the ownership of a business.12 5
Thus, to Smith, the term "profits of stock" was merely another name
for interest, since he considered ownership either of capital or of pro-
duction goods as basically the same thing. Tuttle agrees with Professor
Edgeworth that Smith's concept of capital obviates any specific differ-
entiation between the capitalist and the entrepreneurial functions. As
123. Id. at 504.
124. Tuttle, The Real Capital Concept, 18 Q. J. EcoN. 54, 69 (1904).
125. Tuttle, The Entrepreneur, supra note 121, at 501, 506.
1978]
44
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JO URNAL
Edgeworth says, "To determine at what point the capitalist ends and
the entrepreneur begins, appears to defy analysis."' 25
Thus, while Turgot distinguishes between capitalist and capitalist-
entrepreneur, Smith offers no real entrepreneurial conception of busi-
ness management.
B. The "Projector" as Entrepreneur (Bentham)127
In his interesting doctoral dissertation, Zoltan Sebestyen shows
that Jeremy Bentham in his writings proposes a "projector."'' 28 Ben-
tham's use of the term satisfies, in many ways, the sense of entrepre-
neur, for his projector is an agent who takes an innovation and both
produces and markets it. Bentham enlarges this idea:
The projector is one who seeks to promote his own interest
through. . . the public by some extraordinary exertion of the
inventive faculty, [in the interests of] the pursuit of wealth, or
even of any other project, [the projectors] endeavour, by the
assistance of wealth, to strike into any channel of inven-
tions.12 9
For, with wealth as both the instrument and the end of their activity,
the projectors cultivate those arts which have been by way of eminence
termed useful, and their function is to introduce new commodities to-
ward improvement of quality in those already extant, or to establish
new and more efficient processes of production.
In his economic writings, Bentham further describes the projec-
tors: "[They] aim at anything that can be called improvement; whether
it consists in the production of any new article adapted to man's use, or
in meliorating the quality, or diminishing the expense, of any of those
which are already known to us."' 30 Bentham's projector, therefore, is
one who creates a business enterprise from an invention that is either
his own or another's. This definition, of course, could not have foreseen
the various functions of today's entrepreneur, such as exploration for
new raw materials and development of new markets.
Bentham, however, does anticipate the concept of patent guaran-
tees in his notion that the incentive for the projector is the ability to
126. Edgeworth, The Theory of Distribution, 18 Q. J. EcoN. 159, 204 (1904).
127. Although Jeremy Bentham was not technically a classical economic theorist, he had a
great influence on the classical theorists, especially James Mill, Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.
128. Sebestyen, Jeremy Bentham on Entrepreneurship, Human Capital, and Economic
Development 249 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University) [hereinafter cited
as Sebestyen, Jeremy b'entham].
129. Id at 252.
130. Id at 259.
[Vol. 13:406
45
Telly: The Classical Economic Model and the Nature of Property in the Ei
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
THE NATURE OF PROPERTY
exclude others from imitating his invention. Indeed, he argues force-
fully the necessity of the patent as a means of assuring that the pro-
ducer-projector can sell his product at a price whereby the revenue
received is "superior to the measure of recompense ordinarily annexed
to labor in that line."'' I Moreover, he insists: "A patent considered as a
recompense for the increase given to the general stock of wealth by an
invention, as a recompense for industry and genious and ingenuity, is
proportionate and essentially just. No other mode of recompense can
merit either the one or the other epithet." 132 The temporary "monopoly
privilege" thus allows the projector to earn profits.
Despite the contribution made to the notion of the entrepreneur,
Bentham's views "remained almost unnoticed by professional econo-
mists.' 33 But notwithstanding its limited definition, his term "projec-
tor" has connotations of entrepreneurism in business inasmuch as it
refers to one who transforms an invention into a business enterprise.
C. The Entrepreneur-Ricardo, Say, and J S. Mill
The concept of the entrepreneur is virtually excluded from the the-
ories of Ricardo, of the Ricardians, and of Senior. For these thinkers
(as well as for Karl Marx), the business process does not depend upon
an entrepreneur. Rather, it runs effectively all by itself, so long as there
is available the capital sufficient to ensure its functions. 34
On the other hand, the theory of Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832)
"moving along in the French (Cantillon) tradition, was the first to as-
sign to the entrepreneur-per se and as distinct from the capitalist-a
definite position in the scheme of the economic process."1 35 To Say, the
entrepreneur is the economic agent who
unites all means of production-the labor of the one, the capi-
tal or the land of the others-and who finds in the value of the
products which result from their employment the reconstitu-
tion of the entire capital that he utilizes, and the value of
wages, the interest, and the rent which he pays, as well as the
profits belonging to himself.136
Moreover, this entrepreneur must possess specific personal qualities:
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id. at 263.
133. Cole, An Approach to the Study of Entrepreneurshiq: A Tribute to Edwin F Gay, 6 J.
ECON. HIST. 1-2 (Supp. 1946) [hereinafter cited as Cole, An Approach].
134. Id.; J. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 556 [hereinafter cited as
SCHUMPETER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS].
135. SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 135, at 555.
136. Cole, An Approach, supra note 133, at 3.
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judgement, perseverance, and a knowledge of the world as
well as of business. He is called upon to estimate, with tolera-
ble accuracy, the importance of the special product, the prob-
able amount of the demand, and the means of its production:
at one time, he must employ a great number of hands; at an-
other, buy or order the raw material, collect laborers, find
consumers, and give at all times a rigid attention to order and
economy; in a word, he must possess the art of superintend-
ence and administration ....
To J. B. Say, therefore, the entrepreneur is a vital and forceful
presence in the formation and functions of the business organization.
As several theorists have observed, he is both innovative and adventur-
ous. Furthermore, Say's entrepreneur pulls together the chief economic
factors of land, labor, and capital to make the organization efficiently
and competitively under the aegis of his artful leadership (superintend-
ence) and administration.
John Stuart Mill, influenced at an early age by Say, abandoned the
Ricardian notion of the entrepreneur. Like Smith, Mill uses the English
term "undertaker," and says of it: "It is to be regretted that this word,
in this sense, is not familiar to an English ear. French political econo-
mists enjoy a great advantage in being able to speak currently of les
profits de l'entrepreneur.138
However, Mill describes the capitalist employer as one whose ac-
tivities relate to profit. This entrepreneur is first a capitalist:
the person who advances the expenses of production-who,
from funds in his possession, pays the wages of the labourers,
or supports them during the work; who supplies the requisite
buildings, materials, and tools or machines; and to whom, by
the usual terms of the contract, the produce belongs, to be
disposed of at his pleasure. 139
Moreover, he is a business owner, since he embarks in business on his
own account, and exposes his capital, in varying degrees, to the danger
of partial or total loss. The entrepreneur is also a worker, since he de-
votes
his time and labour [and] the control of the operations of in-
dustry usually belongs to the person who supplies the whole
or the greatest part of the funds by which they are carried on,
137. Id.
138. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in REPRiNTs OF ECONOMIC CLASSICS 406 (W.
Ashley ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Mill, Princ&p0ejJ.
139. Id at 406.
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and who, according to the ordinary arrangement, is either
alone interested, or is the person most interested (at least di-
rectly) in the result.14 0
Mill continues in the same vein: "To exercise this control with effi-
ciency, if the concern is large and complicated, requires great assiduity,
and often, no ordinary skill. This assiduity and skill must be re-
munerated."' 4 1 In accordance with this, "the three parts into which
profit may be considered as resolving itself, may be described respec-
tively as interest, insurance, and wages of superintendence."' 142 In ef-
fect, Mill aims to put into a proper relationship all the functions
attributable to the entrepreneur.
Hence, in Mill's mind, the entrepreneur is a capitalist whose essen-
tial relationship is with profit. He advances the expenses for produc-
tion, land, labor and capital, even as he also takes the risks involved in
establishing a business. All of this, and the hard work concomitant with
it, entitles him to remuneration in the form of profits.
In effect, then, Mill, "who brought the term entrepreneur into gen-
eral use among English economists," gathered together several ideas of
the entrepreneur and gave the final concept a solid position in Classical
Economic Theory.143
V. PART III OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: HOUSEHOLDS
SEEK TO MAXIMIZE INCOMES
The general character and antecedent sources of eighteenth-cen-
tury thought were both Lockean and Newtonian. The philosophy, eth-
ics, and politics of Locke, as well as the fundamental ideas of Newton's
physics, were powerful influences on the entire age. Lockean empiri-
cism mingled with the notion of absolute rationalism. Over all, of
course, was a dominant faith in the
power of the human faculty to reason to solve all problems,
refute and abolish all erroneous beliefs and practices, and
achieve and diffuse into all minds, in time, all of the true
knowledge, understanding, and wisdom needed to guide all
men and societies to the attainment of the highest levels of
wealth, welfare and happiness made possible by their envi-
ronment, nature, and abilities.'44
140. Id. at 407.
141. Id.
142. Id at 404-07.
143. SCHUMPETER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 135, at 556.
144. TAYLOR, QUESNEY TO KEYNES, supra note 94, at 4.
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Nor was this faith in reason any contradiction of empirical knowl-
edge. Morris R. Cohen notes that the great founders of modem science
saw no opposition
between the rational (mathematical or logical) and the empir-
ical (or experimental) elements in their procedure. Literary
historians and philosophers, unacquainted with the actual sci-
entific work of men like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo,
Descartes and Newton have been misled in this respect by Ba-
con, and by some polemic messages in the more popular
works of Galileo and Descartes.
45
The importance of faith in reason, therefore, lay in its application to
human experience. Empirical data (or experimental knowledge) com-
plemented, rather than contradicted, human reasoning.
According to Cohen, rationalism and naturalism were allies in the
war of emancipation from medieval thought. Together, they opposed
what many like Goethe regarded as the essence of medieval-
ism, namely, the view that nature is sin and intellect the devil.
The appeal to reason was a favorite weapon against supersti-
tions and needlessly cruel restraints on natural life. The great
enemy of rationalism, therefore, was not empiricism, but
some form of nonrational authoritarianism, generally super-
natural. 146
Thus did the average eighteenth-century man, as householder and
consumer, begin to look upon himself as a free being with an indepen-
dent and rational mind, an intelligence whose proper function was to
examine the facts of experience and the data of the senses. Such an
intelligence, moreover, was designed to analyze critically all traditional
authoritative doctrines; to discard whatever was erroneous or absurd in
them; and, in the process, to discover new knowledge, carefully derived
from and firmly based upon ideas of demonstrable cogency.
Out of his new awareness of himself grew eighteenth-century
man's distrust in what was arbitrarily authoritative and his belief in the
discoverability of knowledge that would lead to a world of "rationally
reconstructed sciences, of free, enlightened individuals all severally
both thinking and behaving 'rationally' and in line with their own best
interests as individuals and with those of all mankind. 47
145. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE, supra note 94, at 140.
146. Id
147. TAYLOR, QUESNEY TO KEYNES, supra note 94, at 5.
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Accompanying this hope was the idea of psychological "rational-
ism," intellectualism which regarded reason as the universal determi-
nant of human behavior. This notion assigned to "human nature" the
function of defining the natural dimensions of human behavior. In ef-
fect, it asserted the supremacy of man's power to make rational deci-
sions. This supremacy, accordingly, implied the essential rationality in
man's action and conduct of life. Since reason empowers him to make
correct decisions, the tendency to make valid and appropriate choices
among available courses of action is natural to him. He has only to
select that which is logically amenable to the circumstances and to his
reasoned set of objectives. Since all men are so empowered by rational-
ity, the desire of each individual will be mutually consistent with that
of every other, hence with that of the generality of men.
The eighteenth-century conception of man's rationality thus un-
derlies the assumption of Adam Smith (and other Classical Economic
Theorists) that human actions are predicated upon reason. Indeed, it is
this rational being who becomes the "economic man" of the Classical
Economic Model. Since the householder, of course, had his place in the
economy, he was, like all other men, a rational being and therefore an
economic man. His goal was the same as that of any economic man;
but he spoke of his goal as income maximization rather than profit
maximization as would have the owner-entrepreneur.
The Economic Man
Since the economic man is, first of all, a decision-maker, two mod-
em economists have suggested six elements as belonging intrinsically to
the decision-making process. 48 These are: (1) the decision-maker; (2)
the state of nature; (3) the goals or ends to be served; (4) the relevant
alternatives and set of actions from which a choice will be made; (5) a
condition producing a preferential ordering of alternatives; and (6) in-
formation feedback. 149
If we may assume that the decision-making process is composed of
these six elements, they, in turn, must be understood in terms of the
rationalist or economic man. They must be related to assumptions of
Classical Economic Theory that involve decision-making behavior in
148. M. ALEXIS & C. WILSON, ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 149 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as ALEXIS, ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING].
149. The sixth element, i.e., the choice itself, proposed by Alexis and Wilson, is deleted in this
article because it is not an element but in fact the end result of the decision process. On the other
hand, another element, "feedback," is added because it is important in describing the adaptiveness
of the decision-making model.
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its reaction with the environment. Such a description of the six ele-
ments will provide a helpful composite profile of the so-called eco-
nomic man.
Economic man, as the first element in the decision-making pro-
cess, has an infinite capacity for knowledge. He is capable of realizing
and controlling definable variables in the environment, owing to his
rational thought processes. His capacity for knowledge is such that, ul-
timately, he will understand the environment in its totality. 50
The second element in the decision-making process, the state of
nature, is economic man's environment. And since, like the principle of
man, the principle of nature is a rational one, it follows that what man
does not yet know of nature he will eventually learn.!51
A rationalist holds that goals or ends to be served-the third ele-
ment in the decision-making process-are innate in man's nature. For,
if men are at once rational and economically directed, it follows that
they will strive to maximize their income, i.e., for profit maximiza-
tion.152
The element of relevant alternatives (and sets of actions) from
which to choose is an inseparable one from the decision-making pro-
cess. For the concept of "choosing" or "deciding" assumes the existence
of definable available options. Economic man, by virtue of his reason-
ing power, is able to define, within the rational environment of the state
of nature, the relevant options available to him.- 3
A circumstance producing preferential ordering of alternatives is
the fifth element in the decision-making process. Like other elements, it
relates to the fact of man's rationality and his unlimited capacity for
knowledge. Given the natural tendency of that rationality to make cor-
rect decisions, and the presence of this tendency in all rational men, it
follows that reason will determine the best possible order of altema-
150. Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, 51 PSYCH. BULL. 380-81 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Edwards, Decision Making]. See also P. ROBINSON & D. LUCK, PROMOTIONAL DECISION
MAKING: PRACTICE AND THEORY 52 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON, PROMOTIONAL];
ALEXIS, ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 148, at 140-50.
151. Edwards, Decision Making, supra note 150, at 381; see also ALEXIS, ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING supra note 148, at 149-50; H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY
OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 81 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR].
152. Edwards, Decision Making, supra note 150, at 381; see also ALEXIS, ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING, supra note 148, at 150-51; ROBINSON, PROMOTIONAL, supra note 150, at 52;
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 151, at 80.
153. Edwards, Decision Making, supra note 150, at 381; see also ALEXIS, ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING, supra note 148, at 151-54; ROBINSON, PROMOTIONAL, supra note 150, at 52;
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 151, at 81.
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tives. 154
Information feedback is considered here as the sixth element of the
decision-making process. In light of the other five, this concept is useful
in describing the adaptiveness of the decision-making model. To the
eighteenth-century mind, of course, the idea of feedback would appear
irrelevant. Since the natural tendency of rational man's decisions is to-
ward correctness (and this tendency obtains in decisions of all men),
informational feedback is altogether unnecessary. Man's choice and or-
dering of alternatives is governed by the rule of reason, the principle of
rationality which obtains in all of nature.
The image of economic man which emerges from the above defini-
tion of elements in the decision-making process is present in economic
theory even today. It is worth noting that, in Adam Smith, this form of
rational economic man first appears. However, given its dependence
upon empiricism, the conception was considerably altered with the pas-
sage of time. The Classical Economic Theory, as it prevailed through
Mill and the utilitarians, combined empiricism with rationalist thought.
However, the neoclassicism arising in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries saw the withering away of empiricism. Even though
the original notion of the economic man appeared to undergo little
change, more emphasis came to be placed on the value of a priori rea-
soning per se and less upon a priori reasoning coupled with empiricism.
Thus Smith's original image of economic man, depicted by most of the
Classical Theorists, was stripped of his empiricism by the neoclassicists
and became, once more, the plainer, rational, natural man of the
Greeks, Romans, and the Middle Ages.
Robinson and Luck describe the economic man as an "ultrara-
tional, omniscient, supercalculator who relentlessly pursues the single-
minded goal of maximizing profits."' 55 Beneath this Latinate jargon of
present-day economics, however, lurks the same economic man who
was the subject of earlier definitions: he is a rational being with an
infinite and insatiable capacity for knowledge; one who exercises this
capacity in his environment for the purpose of serving his inborn eco-
nomic goals by means of determining correctly his alternatives; he is
one who arrives at rational conclusions without information feedback,
conclusions which are correct inasmuch as they produce the desired
result of income maximization or profit maximization.
154. Edwards, Decision Making, supra note 150, at 381-82; see also ALEXIS, ORGANI-
ZATIONAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 148, at 155-57; ROBINSON, PROMOTIONAL, supra note
150, at 52; SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 151, at 80.
155. ROBINSON, PROMOTIONAL, supra note 148, at 52.
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VI. PART IV OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: COMPETITION
No concept in any discipline, no matter how fully defined, is under
all possible circumstances always clear. Strange as it may seem, the
concept of even simple competition, as set forth by Adam Smith, did
not receive definite and systematic attention until 1871, It had been
treated for years as such an innate part of the scheme of economics that
no one bothered to question its validity or necessity. Even after 1871,
little was done with the idea until the eighteen-nineties and early twen-
tieth century. The elaborate and complex concept of perfect competi-
tion, supposedly one of the clearest in modem economic theory, did not
evolve until after the First World War.
This part then defines competition as it was developed by classical
economic theorists who attempted to synthesize the early ideas. It does
not consider "perfect competition" as Gregory Grossman assumes it in
his development of the model of the Classical Economic Theory.
Early Theorists56
An early theorist, Johann Joachim Becher, was a German mercan-
tilist of the seventeenth century who wrote on monopoly and competi-
tion. He said that monopoly ("monopololium") would result in high
prices while, on the other hand, competition, which should produce
many sellers ("polypolium"), would push prices down.'57
A second writer, Pierre le Pesant (1616-1714), according to Joseph
A. Schumpeter, found in competition "[T]he economic principle of or-
der . . . quite as clearly as did A. Smith a half a century later, [and
further, his] conception of competitive 'proportionate' equilibrium was
as definite as A. Smith's."'' 58
A third writer was the great English-born banker, living in Paris,
Richard Cantillon. What Cantillon wrote about in this area was prima-
rily a "bargaining" type of economic rivalry rather than Adam Smith's
competitive type. Even so, Cantillon discussed market price in such a
way that it is anticipatory of Adam Smith's concept at many points. He
says:
Suppose the Butchers on the one hand & the Buyers on
the other. The price of meat will be determined after some
altercations; a pound of Beef will bear about the same ratio to
156. Much of this material is found in an excellent article by McNulty, .4 Note on the History
of Pe ect Competition, 75 J. POL. ECON. 395 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McNulty, A Note].
157. E. HECKSCHER, 1 MERCANTILISM 271 (1962).
158. SCHUMPETER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS, supra note 134, at 216.
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a piece money, that all the Beef offered for sale in the Market
bears to all the money brought thither to buy Beef.
This proportion is settled by altercation. The Butcher
holds out for a price according to the number of buyers he
sees; the Buyers, on their part, offer less according as they be-
lieve that the Butcher will have less market: the price settled
upon by some is ordinarily followed by others. Some are more
skillful in getting good prices for their merchandise, others
more adroit in discrediting it. Though this method of fixing
the prices of things in the Market has no just or geometrical
basis, since it often depends upon the eagerness of the facility
of a small number of Buyers or of Sellers; yet it does not seem
possible to arrive at it in any other more suitable way. It re-
mains true that the quantity of commodities or of merchan-
dise offered for sale, compared with the demand or with the
number of Buyers, is the basis upon which people fix, or al-
ways think they fix, the prevailing Market prices; & that in
general these prices do not differ much from the intrinsic
value.159
A fourth writer was the physiocrat, Jacques Turgot. He discussed
the concept of competition saying that when there is a great deal of it
the proprietor will raise the rent of his property. Thus the one with the
ability to pay the highest rent will get the land:
The competition of rich entrepreneurs engaged in agri-
culture establishes the current price of leases in proportion to
the fertility of the land and the price at which its produce
sells, always according to estimates which the farmers make
of all their expenses and the profit they should make on their
advances; they can pay the proprietor only the surplus.
But when the competition between them is very keen,
they pay him all this surplus, the proprietor leasing his land
only to the one who offers the highest rent.' 60
Finally, the most complete analysis of competition before Adam
Smith was Sir James Steuart's. He was probably the last of the mercan-
tilists and the most able. His thesis was that competition could exist
among either buyers or sellers. And when supply falls short of demand
he said: "it occasions a competition among the buyers, and raises the
current, that is, the ordinary prices . . .[but] it is from the effects of
competition among sellers that I apprehend prices are brought
159. A. MONROE, EARLY ECONOMIC THOUGHT 261-62 (1948).
160. Id. at 360.
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down."' 16 1 The best situation, Steuart thought, was when competition
operated at the same time among buyers and sellers, which he called
"double competition." He discusses double competition in this passage:
Double competition is, when, in a certain degree, it takes
place on both sides of the contract at once, or vibrates alter-
nately from one to the other. This is what restrains price to the
adequate value of merchandise . . . .Double competition is
what is understood to take place in almost every operation of
trade; it is this which prevents the excessive rise of prices; it is
this which prevents their excessive fall. While double compe-
tition prevails, the balance is perfect, trade and industry flour-
ish.1
62
The above examples show that when The Wealth of Nations was
published in 1776 there was a large accumulation of literature on the
subject of competition. Such competition was recognized as the ten-
dency to bring market prices to a level that would disallow excessive
profits and unsatisfied demand. In a sense then, the period before
Adam Smith's work was a period when ideas emerged, and The Wealth
of Nations is the "capstone" of these ideas, "the concept of competition
[becoming] .. .the sine qua non of economic reasoning."'' 63
The Classical Theorists
Adam Smith discusses the reduced supplies that led to high prices
when he says, "When the quantity of any commodity which is brought
to market falls short of the effectual demand,. . . some [are] willing to
give more. A competition will immediately begin among them, and the
market price will rise more. . . ." When there is an excessive supply,
"some part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the
low price which they give for it must reduce the price." 64
"Competition" is used here in the sense of rivalry. It is as if there
was a race to get limited supplies or to rid oneself of excess products.
As Stigler says, "Competition is a process of responding to a new force
and a method of reaching a new equilibrium."' 65 Further, Adam Smith
looked at economic rivalry as if it was more likely to make gains by
numerous competitors underbidding or overbidding each other. In this
connection, where the competitors are not numerous, Smith says: "The
161. J. STEUART, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 174 (1767).
162. Id. at 196-97.
163. McNulty, 4 Note, supra note 156, at 396-97.
164. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 56-57.
165. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 2 (1957) [here-
inafter cited as Stigler, Perfect Competition].
[Vol. 13:406
55
Telly: The Classical Economic Model and the Nature of Property in the Ei
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
THE NATURE OF PROPERTY
trades which employ but a small number of hands, run more easily into
• ..combinations."' 166 He continues:
If this capital [sufficient to trade in a town] is divided between
two different grocers, their competition will tend to make both
of them sell cheaper, than if it were in the hands of one only;
and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would
be just so much the greater, and the chance of their combining
together, in order to raise the price, just so much the less.' 67
Apparently, according to Stigler, this is all that Adam Smith has to
say about the advantage or disadvantage of few or numerous competi-
tors.
Yet there are some implicit and explicit ideas that run through the
concept of competition that may not have been precisely defined in
Adam Smith's mind. According to Stigler, too, several other ideas
made up the notions that went into the concept of competition. Three
specific ones are:
1) Those who undertake the management of economic units
must have reasonable knowledge of employment conditions in terms of
profit in the various industries. "This equality [of remuneration]"
Smith says, "can take place only in those employments which are well
known, and have been long established in the neighborhood."'6 " On
the other hand, the necessary information is readily available: "Secrets
• . ., it must be acknowledged, can seldom be long kept; and the ex-
traordinary profits can last very little longer than they are kept."169
2) The results of competition are only achieved in the long run.
"This equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labor and stock, and take place only in the
ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of those employ-
ments." 1
7 0
3) Trade must be free. There must be free entry into or exit out
of any trade for the economic unit. Examples of such interferences with
"free competition are exclusive privileges, corporations which exclude
men from trades, and the restrictions imposed on mobility by the settle-
ment provisions of the poor laws.''1
71
166. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 126.
167. Id at 342.
168. Id. at 114.
169. Id. at 60.
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In conclusion, Stigler states five conditions of competition es-
poused by Adam Smith:
1. The rivals must act independently, not collusively.
2. The number of rivals, potential as well as present,
must be sufficient to eliminate extraordinary gains.
3. The economic units must possess tolerable knowl-
edge of the market opportunities.
4. There must be freedom (from social restraints) to act
on this knowledge.
5. Sufficient time must elapse for resources to flow in
the directions and quantities desired by their owners. 7 '
Stigler emphasizes that a modem economist may read more into
the above statements than Adam Smith and his contemporaries would,
for the modem economist looks at competition in a much more sophis-
ticated way. Adam Smith offered no proof to support his assumptions
about competition. The inference is that he probably did not need to
because the operative conditions were directly observable. As Stigler
says "[e]very informed person knew, at least in a general way, what
competition was, and the essence of this knowledge was the striving of
rivals to gain advantages relative to one another."'' 73
Stigler concludes, after admitting that he had not made a search of
the literature, that one would no doubt find that Adam Smith's concept
of competition was not amplified or challenged by any of the classical
theorists with the exception of Caimes. Even his challenge turns out to
be debatable. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the classical the-
ory pertaining to competition was the theory presented by Adam
Smith.
Neo-Classical Theory of Pe ect Competition and Classical Theory
Did the classical theorists have the same theory as the neoclassi-
cists? The literature on classical theory and perfect competition is al-
most nil. Everything was written with a complete disregard of the
classical theory on competition, as if the only theory was pure competi-
tion as presented by the neoclassical theorists. Every beginning text-
book has the pure competition model of four or five parts. They are: 1)
A large number of buyers and sellers. 2) A homogeneous commodity.
3) Buyers and sellers have equal knowledge of market conditions. 4)
Free exchanges among buyers and sellers. 5) Ease of entry into and exit
172. Stigler, Perfect Competition, supra note 165, at 21.
173. Id at 2-3.
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out of industries. Such a model is, of course, different from the classical
model, but it is stated at this time to show that it obviously was derived
from the classical theorists' thinking.
Finally, although it has changed somewhat since the classical theo-
rists, competition continues to be a highly important and viable concept
in economic thought. Stigler concludes his article by saying: "My fun-
damental thesis, in fact, is that hardly any important improvement in
general economic theory can fail to affect the concept of competition.
But it has proved to be a tough and resilient concept and it will stay
with us in recognizable form for a long time to come.174
VII. PART V OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: LAISSEZ-FAIRE
Laissez-faire, as a general and systematically expounded doctrine,
made its appearance in the eighteenth century. As is usually the case
with complex theories, it used ideas from earlier times. It combined the
old with the new and constructed an economic method which did not
have a previous counterpart.
As we have seen the ideas of "freedom" and "nature" underlie
each part of the classical economic model. In the case of laissez-faire,
such an assumption is central. The point of laissez-faire is that each
individual should be allowed to freely pursue his own goals because an
inherent quality in competitive economy makes the common good an
important by-product of such a pursuit. Given this, then, the govern-
ment should function in such a way as to maintain the right of the
individual to achieve his purpose. But where individuals acting alone
go too far and endanger the common good, then the government must
step in to impose restrictions on them in order to act for the good of all.
The devisers of laissez-faire were quite firm about allowing every indi-
vidual a free rein to exercise his abilities in an unrestricted market
place because, ideally speaking, society would be protected from any
depredations by the protective, built-in pattern of God or nature to de-
ter him from damaging the economic good of the community-which,
logically, would include himself.
The previous discussion of private property centers on freedom,
especially from the point of view of individual and common rights, and
nature from the standpoint of Natural Law. These two positions are
entirely satisfactory for the discussion of laissez-faire. A brief reference
might be made to them and then the rest of the discussion might center
174. Stigler, Perfect Competition, supra note 165, at 17. For further comments on the meaning
of competition, see McNulty, A Note, supra note 156, at 398.
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primarily on the role of government as overseer of laissez-faire policy.
But such a discussion seems to deny to laissez-faire some of its most
pervasive and important ideas. Some of these ideas should be included
here: first, because each part of the classical economic model should
stand by itself as much as possible; second, the emphasis on "freedom"
and "nature" as they apply to property is somewhat different from the
model (even though the base is the same); third, although there may be
some repetition (for example, a short discussion of Lockean egoistic
ideas), generally the material-will derive from different and very "in-
vigorating" sources that have clearly influenced laissez-faire policy.1t 5
Although much of the theory of laissez-faire had its origin in Aris-
totle and the Stoics and in medieval theology and philosophy, its emer-
gence in roughly modem form occurred in the writings of the more
immediate predecessors of Adam Smith who greatly influenced him. It
is their ideas and those of the classical theorists who followed him that
will now be discussed. 176
A. The Legacy of Laissez-Paire
Egocentric Man
Thomas Hobbes's "Leviathan" 7
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) lived during a chaotic time in En-
glish history when wars and revolutions were constant occurrences.
From these events he learned two lessons which he stresses in his politi-
cal writings: 1) where there is no government, anarchy will prevail in
the relations of men with each other and, 2) such anarchy can only be
prevented if the government has enough strength to suppress any dis-
pute among its citizens. Taken in conjunction, these points led him to
the conclusion that the sovereign must be given absolute authority, and
that this is the only alternative to life in a state of social upheaval.
This basic outline of Hobbes's philosophy in Leviathan does not
seem to advance man's individual freedom. But Hobbes's philosophy
175. For an excellent discussion of the origins of laissez-faire, see Viner, The Intellectual His-
tory of Laissez-Faire, in THE HENRY SIMONS LECTURES 48-55 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Viner,
IntellectualHistory]; see also W. GRAMP, 1 ECONOMIC LIBERALISM: THE BEGINNINGS (1965); W.
CATLIN, THE PROGRESS OF ECONOMICS: A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 137-45 (1962); F.
NEFF, ECONOMIC DOCTRINES 8-84 (1946).
176. W. SCor, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMICS 61-67 (1933) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT,
THE DEVELOPMENT]; Cannan, Editor's Introduction in SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra
note 117, at xxiii-lvi; Viner, Intellectual History, supra note 175, at 47-48; BELL, ECONOMIC
THOUGHT, supra note 1, at 136-49; Myers, PhilosophicalAnticpahions f/Laissez-Falre, in 4 His-
TORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 163 (1972).
177. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 90.
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was based upon a theory of human nature which is fundamental to his
political thinking. According to Hobbes, man is by nature a selfish and
egoistic creature. He is motivated by internal and private desires which
require satisfaction if he is to be happy. His conduct is explainable, in
the final analysis, by uncovering his motives, and these in turn are al-
ways found to be directed toward the satisfaction of private wants, such
as the desire for food, sex, fame, money, and power.
In order to focus on this point, Hobbes begins Leviathan by
describing life as it was before societies came into existence. He por-
trays a state of war. Life, "red in tooth and claw" as Tennyson de-
scribed nature, is a war of each against all.
Obviously such a state of affairs cannot continue if men are to sur-
vive. Recognizing this, they agree among themselves to erect and abide
by a set of rules which serve to govern their conduct. This agreement,
or "covenant" as Hobbes terms it, explains the origin of society. It de-
velops from the recognized need for peace. At the same time, this cove-
nant creates a government to secure tranquility and to enforce the rules
that will bring about such a condition. This implies that the power of
enforcement be vested in an agent who is outside the fabric of society.
Such an agent becomes a sovereign. And, if he is to be effective in
maintaining social order, his authority must be absolute.
Most theorists assume that Hobbes's theory tends toward to-
talitarianism. Others feel that it does not necessarily do so. "Beyond its
policing functions the state [that Hobbes proposes] need not be an ac-
tive or meddling or planning state."' 1
78
The point Hobbes makes is that man is by nature an egoistic, self-
centered person. 179 This observation greatly affected the thinking of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
John Locke
The theory of John Locke (1632-1704), as it pertains to the indi-
vidual's relation to the state and the state to him, is contained in his
Two Treatises of Government, discussed in the section of the classical
model on property.' ° It will be sufficient to repeat briefly the conclu-
sion to which Locke comes:
178. Viner, Intellectual History, supra note 175, at 57.
179. See also F. McNEILLY, THE ANATOMY OF "LEVIATHAN" (1968); D. GAUTHIER, THE
Looic OF LEVIATHAN: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL POWER OF THOMAS HOBBES (1967); W.
JONES, 2 MASTERS OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: MACHIAVELLI TO BENTHAM (1968).
180. LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 15; see also text and accompanying notes 51-55.
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First, the foundation of his theory is that individuals have a natu-
ral right to life, liberty, and estate. Second, men are members of a com-
munity. Though Locke explains that society depends on the consent of
the majority, he expresses his belief that the community is a specific
unit and the trustee of individual rights. Third, in addition to society
there is government, which is the trustee for the community just as the
community is for the individual. Fourth, the legislature is the most im-
portant part of government. The executive has a lesser role.
The central theme of John Locke's theory concerns the natural
rights of each individual. The great difference, as it applies to the indi-
vidual, between Hobbes and Locke is that Hobbes looks at men as self-
ish and warlike, while Locke looks at them as good and loving. Locke
is aware, however, that strife does exist in the natural state but it is this
quite unsatisfactory condition that causes men to come together to es-
tablish a social contract.' 8 '
Bernard Mandeille-"Fable of the Bees"
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), a contemporary of Locke, was a
Dutch physician who in his youth had settled in England and from its
shores "scandalized" the world with his marvelous satire entitled The
Grumbling Hive or, Knaves Turn'd Honest published in 1705 and subse-
quently republished in 1714 as The Fable of the Bees. or Private Vices,
Public Benefts.182
His work was written as an allegorical poem. In it Mandeville de-
clares that it is the vices of society, such as ambition, greed, and pride,
which advance it in power and wealth. It describes the adventures of a
hive of bees which originally were wicked but prosperous, later reform-
ing their morals only to become poor. As honesty triumphs over the
common vices of pride and envy, the driving need for luxuries to grat-
ify one's palate and passions diminishes. Thus, industry and trade de-
cline and what was once a flourishing society, founded on a healthy
and natural human selfishness, in a short time becomes vulnerable to
its enemies. Finally, decimated in battle, the bees that are left retreat to
a hollow tree to lead temperate, frugal lives "Blest with content and
honesty." By giving up their vices, the bees sacrifice their "progressive"
civilization. The moral of the story is: Do not indulge the utopian long-
181. DUNN, THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE, supra note 97; J. MABBOTr, JOHN LOCKE (1973); J.
GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 1973); M. SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLI-
TICS OF JOHN LOCKE (1969); Strauss, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 66.
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ing for a society which is free of vice, for, "Fools only strive/To make a
Great and Honest Hive."'' 83
Mandeville's ideas effectively stated that we either indulge our
passions directly or we skillfully disguise them, but our behavior is fun-
damentally based upon our overt or latent egoism. If allowed to seek its
own ends, society would become vigorous and successful in the worldly
sense.
The three theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville, have emphat-
ically stated the egoist position. They have taken the stand that there is
a pattern to which all human action conforms. Hence, all human action
other than mere reflex is motivated by a person's desire to promote
their own advantage or interest, whether or not at the expense of others.
Invisible Hand or Encompassing Pattern
Francis Hutcheson
Another theorist, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), was Adam
Smith's professor at Glasgow College. 184 "The never-to-be-forgotten
Dr. Hutcheson," as Adam Smith eulogized him in 1787, was a major
influence on Smith's intellectual outlook. Hutcheson was a follower of
the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and, like Shaftesbury, who
identified private virtues with public benefits, he saw the origin of the
idea of beauty emanating from nature's order and harmony existing
within its infinite variety. What is it that is experienced through the
observer's moral sense as being morally good? Hutcheson's answer was,
benevolence. Hutcheson maintained that men are not motivated by
self-interest entirely but have in their natures a spontaneous and pure
benevolent feeling toward their fellows with no thought of a resulting
benefit to themselves.
It is, therefore, from Hutcheson and the British tradition of moral
philosophy that Adam Smith acquired the concept of "a providential
order of the universe in which man is but an instrument of the Author
of Nature, promoting ends that are not of his intention."'' 85 The idea of
benevolence, however, Adam Smith declined to accept.
The basic concept of the eighteenth century was that natural law
combined with the overall principle of reason which ordered the world
183. Id. at 36.
184. For a discussion of Hutcheson's philosophy and influence on Adam Smith, see J. RAE,
LIFE OF ADAM SMITH (1895); SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117 at xli-li; Viner,
IntellectualHisory, supra note 175, at 58-59; SCOTT, THE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 176, at 62; C.
COLE, THE ECONOMIC FABRIC OF SOCIETY 50-51 (1969).
185. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH, supra note 112, at 231.
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and controlled the men who acted in it seeking through rationality a
knowledge of God's will, often called the "invisible hand." Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson were two theorists who accepted this idea and at-
tempted to propagate it.
The Physiocrats and the Eary Formulation of Laissez-Faire
The physiocrats arrived at the early formulation of laissez-faire.
The physiocrat DuPont attributes to Gournay (a French businessman)
the origin of the famous maxim, "Laissez-faire, Laissez-passer," which
Gournay seems in fact to have popularized. But the study of Turgot's
Eloge de Gournay suggests that the expression Laissez-faire was really
due to LeGendre, a merchant who served in a deputation to Colbert
about 1680 to protest against excessive state regulation of industry and
pleaded for liberty of action in the phrase Laissez-nousfaire.18 6
Laissez-faire As Interpreted by the Physiocrats
In time the phrase laissez-faire signified to the physiocrats an en-
tire doctrine. Into it the physiocrats blended Hobbesism, Cartesian re-
alism, and their own fresh ideas of coordinating free competition. t 87
Their conclusion was that there "was a providential harmonious and
self-operating physical order of nature, which, under appropriate social
organization and sound intellectual perception, could be matched in its
providential character, in its automism, and in its beneficence, in the
social order of nature."' l s Through education, they believed, this
would become evident to all men. Rationality, achieved through educa-
tion, would lead these men then to equate social interest with their own
proper behavior since both would be necessary to realize "the good
life." It was the economists' role to perceive and to make known to the
government this doctrine so that the government would suppress incon-
sistent action on the part of malicious individuals or monopoly
groups. 89 They would benevolently propagate self-interest through en-
lightened despotism. 190
186. H. HIGGS, THE PHYSiOCRATS 67 (1968); s.v. Laissez-Faire, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1933); s.V. Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer, in R. PALGRAVE, DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1963).
187. Viner, "he Intellectual History, supra note 175, at 59; SCOTT, THE DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 176, at 64; SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at vii-viii; SPIEGEL, THE
GROWTH, supra note 112, at 238-239.
188. Viner, Intellectual History, supra note 175, at 59.
189. Id.
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B. Classical Laisse-fiaire
Adam Smith
Synthesis of Three Ideas
Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, pulled together the above
ideas: first, egocentric man selfishly promotes his own self-interest; sec-
ond, an "invisible hand" channels men's actions so that in effect they
are for the good of society in toto; third, government will function posi-
tively in order to remove hindrances to man acting egocentrically.
It is obvious that the physiocrats already had pulled these ideas
together. But Adam Smith made a clearer analysis of the theory and
changed it in two major respects-the government he advocated was a
free government and further, some economic actions could not be done
by individuals. Adam Smith recommended positive government action
in such areas.
The doctrine of laissez-faire became one of the major themes of
classical economic theory, although Adam Smith never used the phrase
"laissez-faire" in his book.191 It was not until 1848, when John Stuart
Mill used the phrase in the title of one of the sections of his book Prin-
ciples of Political Economy, that it became widely used by classical the-
orists. ' 92
Adam Smith interpreted laissez-faire to mean:
1) Egoistic man. Man was an egoistic being whose prime psycho-
logical drive as an economic being is the drive of self-interest. (Derived
from Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville, above).
A famous passage from The Wealth of Nations expresses this con-
cept very well:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard
to their own interests. We address ourselves, not to their hu-
manity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our
own necessities but of their advantages ... 93
191. A. JENKINS, ADAM SMITH TODAY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
"THE WEALTH OF NATIONS," SIMPLIFIED, SHORTENED AND MODERNIZED 16 (1948). The refer-
ence is to Jenkins' introduction where he affirms that Adam Smith does not use the term laissez-
faire in The Wealth of Nations. Moreover, Jenkins says that Adam Smith was against laissez-faire,
but Jenkins interprets laissez-faire as meaning no government intervention whatsoever. But where
laissez-faire means limited government intervention, then Jenkins agrees that Adam Smith enter-
tained such thinking. He says that Adam Smith "specifically lists cases where intervention of the
state is beneficial, and even essential to justice and prosperity." Id at 16.
192. Mill, Principles, supra note 138, at 950.
193. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 14.
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2) Invisible hand. An invisible hand leads men to promote social
benefits which he has no conscious intention of advancing. (Derived
from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and the Natural Law theorists, above).
In The Wealth of Nations the concept is presented in this way:
He [the individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to pro-
mote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promot-
ing it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing
that industry in such manner as its produce may be of greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worst
for the society that is no part of it. By pursuing his own inter-
est he frequently promotes that of society more effectually
than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for the public
good. 1
94
3) Government's role in maintaining "the invisible hand" and limit-
ing positive activities. The Government's role, through its Hobbesian
monopoly of power, was to maintain the "evident" doctrine and to sup-
press inconsistent and hostile action on the part of ignorant or mali-
cious individuals or groups or nations.'95 (Derived from the
Physiocrats). Certain positive functions, moreover, which cannot be
practically accomplished in any other way, will be undertaken by a free
government.
It should be noted that, pertaining to the positive action of govern-
ment, Adam Smith intended a relatively free government restricting
men's actions, whereas the physiocrats were interested in an enlight-
ened despot doing so. In that respect, Adam Smith's concept of laissez-
faire differed from that of the Physiocrats. In all other respects it was
essentially the same.
In a deliberate and comprehensive generalization, Smith made it
abundantly clear that he would narrowly restrict the activities of gov-
ernment. He says, "According to the system of natural liberty, the sov-
ereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great
importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understand-
ings: . . ."196 Then he enumerates them:
194. Id. at 423.
195. Viner, Intellectual History, supra note 175, at 59.
196. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 651.
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first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and
invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of
protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society
from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it,
or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice;
and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain
public works and certain public institutions, which it can
never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of
individuals, to erect and maintain;...
Smith does not elaborate much on each of these functions. It seems
appropriate, nevertheless, to briefly go into more detail on the second
function. Jacob Viner includes in this function, gathered from Adam
Smith's writings and lectures, these basic parts: a) punishment and en-
forcement of redress; b) preventive measures to give security against
the perpetration of dishonesty, extortion, and violence; c) enforcement
of contracts; d) a law obligating masters to pay wages in money rather
than in kind to protect workers against fraud; e) protecting slaves
against violence of their masters; and f) regulation of paper money
banking. 198
At this juncture, it should be stated that Adam Smith and the
others of the classical school had little trust in the competence or good
faith of government. Hence, they preached the doctrine of laissez-faire
but, as is obvious from the above, they never preached the dogma of no
government intervention. Laissez-faire meant government support of a
society which fostered the egocentric economic man who was guided by
the invisible hand. It made allowance for limited but sound govern-
ment intervention where individuals could not themselves operate ef-
fectively.
John Stuart Mill: Interpretation of Laissez-faire
by the Classical School
John Stuart Mill, one of the last classical theorists, in the chapter
entitled "Of The Functions of Government in General" in his book,
Principles of Political Economy, classified the functions of government
and the exceptions made to the laissez-faire principle. 199 In another in-
teresting chapter, entitled "Interference of Government Grounded on
197. Id.
198. Viner, Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire, in ADAM SMITH 1776-1926: LECTURES TO COM-
MEMORATE THE SESQUICENTENNIAL OF THE PUBLICATION OF "THE WEALTH OF NATIONS" 144-
46 (J. Clark, P. Douglas & J. Hollander eds. 1928).
199. Mill, Princ#ies, supra note 138.
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Erroneous Theories," he attacks government interference that he feels
is unwarranted because such intervention may be based on incorrect
theoretical assumptions.
Then, in the most famous chapter on laissez-faire, entitled "The
Grounds and Limits of the Laissez-Faire on Non-Interference Princi-
ple," he discusses the free agency of individuals and the government's
relation to this freedom.
Most of the classical theorists discussed laissez-faire because it was
so central to classical economic theory. So does Mill. Mill's work on
laissez-faire was the most famous produced by the later theorists and
thus is briefly mentioned in this article. Basically, other than differences
of opinion as to what in particular the government ought to do, the
classical theorists made few changes from Adam Smith's theory with
one exception. After Adam Smith, the classical theorists secularized the
classical doctrine and thus dispensed with the appeal to an "invisible
hand" to bolster up the argument that man acted in his own interests
and would at the same time serve the community well. Instead, they
attributed the socially beneficial behavior of individuals not to the ra-
tionalistic perception by those individuals that the common good was
also their own private good, but to an inherent quality in competitive
economic behavior which made the common good an incidental and
not a deliberately sought by-product of the pursuit by the individual of
his own particular interest.
The final meaning of laissez-faire to the classical economic theo-
rists was:
1) Man is an egoistic being whose prime phychological
drive as an economic being is the drive of self-interest.
2) There is an inherent quality in the competitive econ-
omy which makes the common good an incidental by-product
of the pursuit by the individual of his own particular good.
3) A free government will maintain the rights of the in-
dividual to act for his own selfish interests by essentially not
acting but, at the same time, it will function in those areas in
which it is not feasible for anyone but government to act, for
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VIII. PART VI OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: HOUSEHOLDS HAVE
FREEDOM OF HOUSEHOLD CHOICE AND FIRMS HAVE
FREEDOM OF ENTERPRISE
It is important at this point to remind the reader of the two struc-
tural assumptions holding up the classical model: that men have free-
dom and that they are guided by the rational forces around them.
Although in the other sections the two assumptions are important, in
this section the discussion will stress them in some detail. These as-
sumptions have been looked at politically in other sections, but in this
section they must be looked at from the standpoint of economics.
The two major actors in this section are the consumer and the pro-
ducer. Economically, the consumer has buying power and earning
power. Thus, this section discusses the rights of individuals to purchase
goods and to seek jobs so that purchasing power (money) can be
earned. The producer is the corporation. Economically, the producer
has rights to decide what, how, when, and where to produce goods.
These questions relate to the corporate purchasing power in terms of
buying land, materials, and so on, in order to create goods which are
sold in order to make profits, and thus create earning power in order to
stay in business.
The essence of this section, then, is the economic relationships of
consumers and firms in a free economic society.
A. Household Choice2°°
Freedom of Consumer Choice
Let us begin with households then. Here begin in various social
complexes consumer purchase rights. The right to buy goods available
for purchase (assuming that their purchasing power is sufficient) is free-
dom of consumer choice. This right may be strictly limited if the soci-
ety places restrictions on purchasing power, such as allowing only the
nobility to purchase certain goods (sumptuary laws), or, in modem
times, has rationing (which occurred in England and the U.S. and other
countries during World War II) or, if people are doled out goods in
predetermined amounts (as happened in Russia during the period of
the Bolshevik Revolution) or, if certain goods are not allowed to be
produced or imported because the state decides they are unnecessary
200. Much of the following comes from GROSSMAN, Economic Systems supra note 11, at 9-
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(as in Russia, where chewing gum was not allowed to be produced or
imported, at least through 1965).
Hence, the classical economic theorists felt strongly that, in the
free economic society they were espousing, the consumer should have
the right to purchase any goods on the open market without interfer-
ence by government or any other source.
Freedom of Job Choice
The right of individuals to freely accept any job within the limits
of their abilities and to quit any job and move to another is freedom of
job choice. In most societies, this freedom has limitations because of
professional degree requirements, restrictions imposed by labor groups,
military service and so on. Some of these requirements are assumed to
be necessary, in order to protect people against incompetence, and to
protect the nation from attack. Such limitations are minor compared to
the limitation in many societies where job choice is almost totally non-
existent. In India, for example, the caste system for centuries did not
permit job choice. Under the European feudal system of the Middle
Ages, many were tied to the land as serfs and for all intents and pur-
poses existed in a caste system or one of modified slavery. In some to-
talitarian countries today, people do not make job choices but the state
makes the choices for them in various prescribed ways.
The right to quit a job and find another allows people to improve
their earnings and thus adds to the competitive structure of society
since workers can be lured to other industries and jobs by higher wages.
In India, under the old caste system, not only was the job chosen for an
individual based upon his father's job, but no person, except with great
difficulty, could leave his predetermined job. If there was a change, it
had to be within the jobs available horizontally in that caste structure.
A person could never leave the particular caste he was born into and go
up a caste or two.
In the feudal system, which the classical theorists were fighting
against, the serf was tied to the land and had nowhere else to go. And
in many totalitarian societies today, the job in which the state places a
person cannot be left very easily, if at all.
Thus the classical theorists were convinced that in a free economic
society the consumer-laborer had the right to choose his own job as
well as the right to quit that job and seek another that would give him
more money. In effect, the classical theorists proposed labor mobility.
Competition, therefore, would operate freely among corporations.
[Vol. 13:406
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They would acquire labor on a competitive basis by offering higher
wages. This, however, did not necessarily mean vertical mobility into
the upper leisured classes, just horizontal mobility among the laboring
class itself. (This topic will be discussed in more detail in the later sec-
tions on labor).
B. Firm or Corporate Choice
Freedom of Enterprise2 "'
A business enterprise is an economic entity which functions within
society. In the classical theorist's day, the business enterprise was small
and the head of it was an individual or a small group of individuals,
later called entrepreneurs, who promoted and ran the business. The
concept of the classicists was that the firm should be completely free to
acquire the resources it wanted and could pay for, to use any available
technology, to produce any goods, to sell them at any price in the com-
petitive market, and to invest profits in any way it pleased. If these
economic rights should be allowed in the society within which it func-
tioned, then there was freedom of enterprise. Adam Smith expresses
the position well:
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital
can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the
greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in this local
situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver
can do for him. The statesman, who should attempt to direct
private people in what manner they ought to employ their
capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be
trusted not only to no single person, to no council or senate
whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in
the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to
fancy himself fit to exercise it.202
Further, Adam Smith presents the position again, with an even
stronger message:
All systems either of preference or of restraint, being thus
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of nat-
ural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as
201. Id. See also G. BJORK, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 122-25 (1969); M. COPELAND, OUR FREE ENTERPRISE
ECONOMY 1-14, 232-72 (1965); R. EELS & C. WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS
301-03, 420-21 (rev. ed. 1969); L. VON MIsEs, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 286-
87 (rev. ed. 1963).
202. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 423.
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long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly
free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both
his industry and capital into competition with those of any
other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely dis-
charged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which, he
must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the
proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowl-
edge could ever be sufficient: the duty of superintending the
industry of private people, and of directing it towards the em-
ployments most suitable to the interest of the society.203
In reality, there are limits to the business organization's doing as it
pleases. Many regulations, such as zoning laws, building codes, provi-
sions in the corporate charter, and so on, may be restrictive. The classi-
cal theorists recognized that there would be some restrictions on the
business organization's movement, but they advocated as little interfer-
ence as possible by government or any power coalition.
Freedom to Create New Economic Institutions
Grossman presents this concept in terms of today's corporation,
but it seems valid for the classical theorists' model in a limited sense.
By advocating a free society, they, as a corollary, advocated competi-
tion. It would be entirely logical to assume that some variations in the
corporate way of conducting business would be allowed in order to
meet new demands from competition within their own ranks. But for
these institutions to make substantial changes in their structure and in
their ways of doing things would not be in line with classical thought.
The classical economic theorists in their day were revolutionaries who
propagated a new system but they were not revolutionaries who looked
to the future, to an evolving system which would differ from what they
propagated. Theirs was the scientific "natural" system which obeyed
certain fundamental laws, and, as far as they were concerned, there
were no others.
Thus, they would allow some innovations which were basically
within the system and consequently only variations, but they could not
think in terms of radically new ideas. Theirs was the idea.
With the passage of time this idea has assumed a popular name,
"free enterprise."
203. Id. at 65.
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IX. PART VII OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL: PRICES MOVE FREELY
Classical economic theory as initiated by Adam Smith owes much
to its predecessors. In this instance, the central ideas of price, supply
and demand, and equilibrium were not new when Adam Smith wrote
The Wealth of Nations. But placing them into such a central position in
the classical economic model, along with competition, and causing
price to become the regulator in a free economic society, was quite rev-
olutionary.
Price in a free, decentralized economic system is the regulatory
mechanism. This is Smith's thesis as it pertains to price.z 4
Smith begins his famous chapter "Of The Natural and Market
Price of Commodities" in The Wealth of Nations by saying that in
every society or neighborhood there exists an average or ordinary rate
of wages, profits, and rents which is "natural" with respect to the time
and place it prevails.2 5 Therefore when a commodity sells for a price
which is high enough to compensate the worker, the landlord, and the
owner of stock at the "natural" rate, the commodity is being sold at its
"natural price." "The commodity," he states "is then being sold pre-
cisely for what it is worth." 2 6 But this does not mean that the commod-
ity will always sell for its natural price. There will be changes in
demand for and supply of the commodity that will cause the market
price to rise above or fall below the natural price. The deviation from
the natural level will generally be corrected because supply will change
to suit the demand which will cause the market price to rise or fall, as
the case may be, until it returns to the natural price. Smith states it in
this way:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to
which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitat-
ing. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended
a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even
somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which
hinder them from settling in this center of repose and continu-
ance, they are constantly tending towards it.20
7
204. This section is heavily indebted to E. HEIMANN, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC THEORY (1944) [hereinafter cited as HEIMANN, ECONOMIC
DOCTRINES]; M. BLAUo, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT]; RIMA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 190.
205. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 55.
206. Id.
207. Id at 58.
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Hence, Smith sees the long-term natural price as a long-term equilib-
rium price which tends always to be reestablished as a result of short-
term adjustments of supply and demand.
For Smith, demand and supply were not thought of in the sched-
uled sense that we think of them. He thought of supply and demand as
a willingness of the participants in a market to buy or sell at a particu-
lar price rather than at various prices. He looked at the market price as
being restored to the natural price level when short-run shifts occurred
in the supply schedule. When he says that the "quantity" of a commod-
ity is too small to meet the "effectual demand," and the market price
rises above the natural price, he means, in modem terms, that there is
an upward shift in the supply curve. On the other hand, when the sup-
ply is larger than the demand, the market price will drop below the
natural price since, in modem terms, the supply curve will shift down-
ward. The market price is equal to the natural price only when the
quantity brought to market is enough to meet the demand. 08 In
Smith's words: "When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient
to supply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally
comes to either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of the same natu-
ral price."20 9 Consequently, for Smith, the interaction of demand and
supply under competitive conditions determined prices in the short run;
the natural price, however, was a long-run price that was independent
of demand forces. This natural price was conceived as determined by
the costs that were incurred on the supply side of the market. These
costs were not affected by the rate of output because it was assumed
that they were constant. This means that the "natural" position around
which price fluctuates is cost. Anything above cost is profit. Anything
below cost, of course, is loss. Cost is totalled by adding up the pro-
ducer's labor, materials, tools, rent, and use of capital (interest).210
It is important to recognize that competition is the indispensable
condition of natural price. When price and profit rise then expansion of
output will soon follow. But not all those who produce goods will re-
spond the same. Many outsiders will be lured in by the high profits.
The rise in expansion will mean more goods and the demand will
lessen with the resulting lowering of prices and profit. Sometimes there
will be a natural scarcity or a legal advantage and a monopoly will thus
arise. The prices will therefore be maintained above their natural
208. RIMA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 190, at 77.
209. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 57.
210. HEIMANN, ECONOMIC DOCTRINES, supra note 204, at 66.
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rate.21 1 As Smith expresses it: "The monopolists by keeping the market
constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual de-
mand, sell their commodities much above natural price, and raise their
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profits, greatly above
their natural rate. '212 It is obvious that an advocate of free competition,
like Smith, was very much against monopolies.
Price is the manifestation of value. And Smith does talk about
value in this chapter. For centuries the distinction has been between
value in use and value in exchange. Value in exchange is what corre-
sponds to natural price. Smith says that value in use is a precondition
of exchange value, because things would have no exchange value if
they had no value in use. The problem is that value in use does not
always have value in exchange or price.213 Smith saw what had been
contrasted by such writers as Locke, Law, and Harris, that useful things
such as water or bread are cheap while less useful things such as
diamonds are expensive.214 The point is, though, that the usefulness of
a commodity will not always determine the price. The conclusion was
that the relative scarcity of the commodity will determine the price re-
gardless of the usefulness of the article. And the relative scarcity is gov-
erned in the short run by demand and supply; in the long run by the
cost of producing the article. Blaug explains the problem of the eight-
eenth-century theorists when he says: "This curious belief that only the
short-run or current price of a commodity is the province of the forces
of demand and supply is very characteristic of 18th century economics,
and it is a belief that survived until the marginal revolution."21
The gist of Adam Smith's argument on price can be summarized
in two propositions:2
16
1) Price is determined by the ratio between demand and supply,
and rises and falls with that ratio. The analysis of demand had not yet
been made; thus the eighteenth-century thinking on demand was that it
is of a given magnitude at'any moment and may change in time. Later
on demand was understood as a schedule, meaning a readiness to take
more commodities at a lower price and few commodities at a higher
price, but that was an unknown factor at this time. Also considered as
given or assumed in Smith's theory is the short-run supply. Conse-
211. Id. at 66-67.
212. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 61.
213. HEIMANN, ECONOMIC DocTRINES, supra note 204, at 67.
214. BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT, supra note 204, at 43.
215. Id. at 43.
216. HEIMANN, ECONOMIC DOCTRINES, supra note 204, at 65-66.
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quently, the ratio rises when the demand is higher or the supply lower,
and it falls when the opposite pertains. This ratio is what determines
"market price."
2) If the price of a commodity rises, then there is an increase in
the gain to be made by its sale and this encourages an increase in out-
put. When prices fall, there is a loss to the seller and it is very difficult,
psychologically and monetarily, to continue to produce at the former
level. Therefore, the ups and downs of the market price, which are but
reflections of the fluctuations in demand for a particular commodity,
stimulate a corresponding contraction or expansion of output. In this
way, the previous ratio of demand to supply is regained on a different
level of absolute numbers and the previous price is restored. Price,
therefore, in a free decentralized economic system, is the regulatory
mechanism.
Other Classical Theorists
Generally, the classical theorists followed Adam Smith's analysis
of price theory. Much of what Adam Smith analyzed had been known
for some time. The general principles of supply and demand had been
developed earlier, but Adam Smith gave them an honored place in a
free market system with price ending up as the regulator. There was a
good deal of discussion of Ricardo and Mill on monetary and price
theory but little change from Smith's thinking. Perhaps the most impor-
tant changes were made by his disciple, Jean-Baptiste Say, in what is
now called "Say's Law." It is a monetary theory that extends Smith's
thinking but does not change the underlying thesis of classical theory as
presented by him, although it was a significant contribution to classical
theory.
It was after classical theory and the rise of Marshall and the neo-
classical theorists when many changes were made in the clas:sical price
theory during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
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Historical Background of Wealth and Production
Nature of Wealth
The first problem is to determine the nature of "wealth" which is
the subject of production and distribution. Unlike the mercantilists,
Adam Smith attacked the notion that gold and silver were the primary
measures of wealth. Smith, and essentially all of the classical theorists,
assumed the existence of private property and the practice of exchange.
Wealth, to them, was the annual produce of the "real wealth" of a na-
tion, that is, original revenue and derived revenue. Original revenue is
equal to the wages of productive labor, rent of land, and profits of
stock. Derived revenue is equal to the wages of unproductive labor and
rent of houses. Needless to say, many theorists, including some of the
classical theorists, disagreed with these definitions. Nevertheless, they
serve as reasonable definitions of some of the classical theorists. After
Adam Smith, wealth and its sources became an important part of polit-
ical economic theory.218
Production Equals Labor, Capital, Land
English economic treatises are commonly divided into several sec-
tions, two of which are generally entitled "Production" and "Distribu-
tion." Before Smith's time they were not used as technical economic
terms. The practice of ascribing production to the cooperation, concur-
rence or joint use of three great agents, instruments or requisites of
production, Labor, Capital, and Land, apparently originated in Adam
Smith's division of the component parts of prices into wages, profit, and
rent. The next obvious step was to say that the revenues of the commu-
nity are produced by labor, capital, and land. J. B. Say was the first to
employ these terms. Torrens follows him and J. S. Mill uses the first
two and only subsequently adds a description of the third. Conse-
quently, not until as late as 1848 did the use of Say's terms become
entirely clear. That production equalled labor, capital, and land, how-
217. The material for this part of the classical model is primarily based on E. CANNAN, A
HISTORY OF THE THEORIES OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION IN ENGLISH POLITICAL
ECONOMY FROM 1776 TO 1848 (1953) [hereinafter cited as CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION].
218. Id. at 1-25.
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ever, slowly began to be realized as an economically important distinc-
tion. Eventually, it became central to economic thought.
Labor
Adam Smith says that the great increase in the productiveness of
industry results from the division of labor, which
is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase
of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the sav-
ing of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one
species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a
great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour
and enable one man to do the work of many." 1 9
There was a lot of disagreement among subsequent followers of
Smith about these "circumstances." Some even added to them.
M'Culloch in his Principles gave as the "first and most indispensible of
the means by which the productive powers of labor are increased" the
"security of property" and "cooperation."22 0 J. S. Mill agreed with
M'Culloch and enumerated three other causes for labor, capital, and
land being of superior productiveness, namely, "greater energy of la-
bor," "superior skill and knowledge" and "superiority of intelligence
and trustworthiness in the community generally." 2 ' Most theorists,
nevertheless, agreed on Smith's division of labor but felt there was
more that remained to be developed out of it. The general thesis of all,
though, is that man is like a machine. If we observe carefully and ob-
jectively, we will find what makes a rational man under the classicists'
system appears to be an automaton.
Capital
1) Origins of the capital of a community. According to Adam
Smith, a man's stock or capital-wealth may be divided into the part
which he invests in a business intended to bring in a money return and
the part which he retains for his own use. 2 The first part is "capital."
He divided an individual's capital into two parts: circulating and fixed.
Circulating capital is employed in growing produce, manufacturing or
purchasing goods and selling them again at a profit. Fixed capital is
employed in the improvement of land, purchase of useful machines or
219. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 7.
220. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 40.
221. Mill, Princples, supra note 138, at 5.
222. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 262.
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instruments of trade, or in such things that yield a revenue or profit
without changing masters. In effect, it becomes frozen capital.
As for the stock of the community, Smith divides the whole of it
into three portions: one, the reserve for consumption, two, the fixed
capital, and three, the circulating capital. A brief explanation of each is
in order:
First, the reserve for consumption consists of "the stock of food,
clothes, household furniture, etc., which have been purchased by their
proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely consumed, [and of]
the whole stock of mere dwelling-houses too subsisting at any one
time.,223
Second, the fixed capital consists of "(a) useful machines and in-
struments of trade, (b) profitable buildings which are the means of pro-
curing revenue, (c) improvements of land [and] (d) the acquired and
useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society."22 4
Third, the circulating capital consists of "(a) money, (b) provisions
in the possession of sellers (c) materials and unfinished goods in posses-
sion of the makers, and (d) finished goods in the possession of makers,
merchants, or retailers. 225
2) The functions of the capital of a community. When it comes to
the functions of the capital of the community, Adam Smith endeavors
to show that the accumulation of capital is necessary in order to enable
exchange and division of labor to flourish. He shows, with some vigor,
that if there were no such trade as that of a butcher, every man would
be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep every time he
wanted beef or mutton.226 So if men lived in isolation from one an-
other, not putting into practice all exchange of goods, the stock of cattle
and sheep would have to be enourmously increased in order to give an
equal result.
Smith ascribes different functions to fixed and circulating capital.
To him, machines typically represent fixed capital. The machines
which constitute part of the capital of the nation are highly useful be-
cause they enable labor to produce quickly and easily.
But it is circulating capital which puts industry into motion. The
amount of industry must remain the same if the capital remains the
same. But an increase in capital of a country increases the quantity of
industry and a decrease in its capital decreases the quantity of industry.
223. Id. at 264-66.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id at 342.
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In addition, Smith argues that circulating capital consists of those
goods that yield a return to their owners by being sold. This is in con-
trast to fixed capital goods which take part in the productive process
without changing hands. The fundamental characteristic of circulating
capital is that it embodies a quality of purchasing power that always
returns to the owner as he disposes of it.227 Since fixed capital was de-
fined as not only including implements and buildings, but also human
capital, that is, the capital value of the abilities and habits of all mem-
bers of the society, then capital stands for produced means of produc-
tion and the acquired skills of workers are surely "produced" by means
of material resources.
Smith's major point then becomes clear. It is that accumulation of
capital is necessary if the exchange of goods and the division of labor
are to flourish. Smith goes on to show how each of the three stocks of
the community help considerably in keeping it flourishing.
In general, Adam Smith's successors, Mill, Malthus, Ricardo,
M'Cullock and J. S. Mill, followed his views on capital.
Land
1) Land in general. David Hume said that, "[E]verything useful
to the life of man arises from the ground. ' 228 It has always been recog-
nized that land is a requisite of production. Productiveness of industry
depends upon the quality of the land, that is, fertility of the soil, acces-
sibility to minerals, richness of fisheries, and so on. Smith, and the rest
of the classical theorists, accepted Hume's statement without question.
2) Population. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most
writers on economics declared that it was desirable to have an increase
in population. Smith agreed with the general consensus when he said:
"The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the in-
crease of the number of its inhabitants. 229 Most writers such as
Vauban, Joshua Gee, and Palen agreed.23 °
In 1798 Malthus wrote An Essay on the Princole of Population As
It Effects The Future Improvement of Society.231 He had been disputing
with his father the general question of the improvement of society, and
had determined that the necessary checks to the growth of population
227. Based on Smith's analysis, later writers thought of circulating capital only in terms of
money, an error which seriously affected the theory of capital for many years.
228. Hume, Of Interest, in DAVID HUME: WRITINGS ON ECONOMICS 51 (Rotwein ed. 1970).
229. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 70.
230. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 97-102.
231. T. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON POPULATION (P. Appleman ed. 1976).
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could be used as an argument against the possibility of society ever
arriving at the state of perfection that was argued by William Godwin
and Condorcet. All the checks on the growth of population, he argued,
necessarily produce misery or vice; thus, if the checks are always neces-
sary, then vice and misery will always exist and perfectibility becomes
impossible. Such was the argument contained in the first edition of his
book.
In the second edition, entitled An Essay on The Princole of Popula-
tion,- Or, A View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness,232
Malthus argued a bit differently from the first edition. The question
then was not, as it is today, a question of density of population and
productiveness of industry; it was a question concerning the compara-
tive rapidity of the increase of population and the increase of the an-
nual production of food. Malthus did not think that checks on the
growth of population were made necessary by the population having
approached or exceeded some economic limit, but simply by the impos-
sibility of increasing the annual production of food as fast as an un-
checked population would increase. The reason for this conclusion was,
he argued, that when left unchecked the population would increase in a
geometric ratio. On the other hand, subsistence increases only in an
arithmetic ratio. It can readily be seen that the smallest sum accumulat-
ing at a geometric rate eventually grows much larger and faster than
the largest sum accumulating at an arithmetic rate. His conclusion was
that the earth could not feed a burgeoning population.
Malthus was one of the classical theorists and his theory of popu-
lation became an important part of their production theory. Not all of
the classical theorists agreed with his conclusion, but they agreed that
the problem had to be dealt with.
3) Law of diminishing returns. The year 1815 saw the appearance
of four publications by West, Torrens, Malthus, and Ricardo. Each one
independently formulated a theory of differential rent, and each re-
acted to a recent fall in grain prices. The underlying explanation, ac-
cording to the four, was the law of diminishing returns, that is, as West
put it, "[I]n the progress of the improvement of cultivation the rising of
crude produce becomes progressively more expensive." 233 He contin-
ued, "Each equal additional quantity of work bestowed on agriculture
yields an actually diminished return . . . Whereas it is obvious that
232. T. MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION OR A VIEW OF ITS PAST AND
PRESENT EFFECTS ON HUMAN HAPPINESS, (7th ed. repr. of 1872 ed.).
233. BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 204, at 80-89.
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an equal quantity of work will always fabricate the same quantity of
manufactures. 234 One would assume from West's formulation of the
principle that it only holds true for a given state of technology, but all
four theorists thought that returns in agricultural activity actually do
diminish in time in spite of technological change.2 35
The "law" of diminishing returns became a part of classical theory
after these four theorists published their views. The problem of defin-
ing exactly what was meant by diminishing returns was not really




The Idea of Distribution
Historical Background
The use of the noun "distribution" goes back to Adam Smith's The
Wealth of Nations where it is first used in Book I entitled, "Of the
Causes of Improvement in The Productive Powers of Labour, and of
the Order According To Which Its Produce is Naturally Distributed
Among The Different Ranks of The People." Before Adam Smith, En-
glish economists did not talk of "distribution" or of the manner in
which wealth or produce is distributed.237 In France, on the other hand,
Turgot had used the term before The Wealth of Nations was published.
It seems quite clear that both parties acquired the use of the word from
Quesnay.
Although the account of distribution does not occupy a main place
in the body of Book I in The Wealth of Nations, the effect has been to
identify distribution in economic treatises with the discussion of the
causes which affect wages, profit, and rent. Ricardo, J. B. Say and
James Mill refer to distribution and, under that heading, specifically
place wages, profits, and rents.238 Since that time, the major topics
under the heading of "Distribution" in a standard English economics
text have been retained under these categories.239
234. Id.
235. Id
236. Id (for a discussion of Ricardo's theory of differential rent).
237. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 144.
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The Meaning of Wages, Profit, and Rent
There seems to be little doubt that Adam Smith and his followers
intended only true income to be included in wages, profits, and rents.
The proposition that the produce or income is divided into wages, prof-
its, and rents has always meant the same as the equation:
Total produce or income = wages + profit + rents.
Then, wages, profits, and rents must always be understood to represent
net (that is net wages, net profits, and net rents).
Furthermore, wages applied to amounts received by the lower-
wage class of workers from persons who hired them at fixed rates even
before any production had taken place. Profit was a vague term appli-
cable to any kind of gain if some expense or risk had to be incurred.
Rent meant the periodic payments made to owners of land, houses, and
other fixtures to the land (e.g., barns, sheds, and so on).240
Pseudo-Distribution
Background- Wages per head, Profits per cent, and Rent per acre
The problem now is to discover the causes which determine the
proportions in which the produce is distributed between the three divi-
sions. Although Smith declared that the entire annual produce is distri-
buted into wages, profit, and rent, meaning the total of each, the last
four chapters of Book I of The Wealth of Nations deal with wages per
head, profits per cent, and rent per acre. Since most subsequent writers
discussed these headings first and the division of produce between
wages, profits, and rents, second, or not at all, this discussion begins in
the same order.
Wages per head
When The Wealth ofNations was written, the subsistence theory of
wages was the general rule among the political economists of the pe-
riod. It assumes that in order to live and work a man must have some-
thing to exist on, and that the wage-earner need not and should not
claim more than enough to modestly shelter, feed, and clothe himself.
Smith apparently starts with the subsistence theory, but in the last part
of the chapter he ends with the supply and demand theory which as-
sumes that labor is a commodity, the demand for which depends upon
240. Id. at 149-57. Carman expands on this brief interpretation and shows some differences in
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the amount of funds ready to be laid out for it. He becomes one of the
originators of the supply and demand theory of wages.24' Malthus, Ri-
cardo, Senior, and J. S. Mill also followed this line of reasoning.
Variations of Profits per cent
In the first chapter on the profits of stock, Smith maintains that the
rise and fall of the rate of profit is due to the increasing or declining
state of the wealth of society.242 High profit causes rapid accumulation,
and this causes high wages. But, "when the most fertile and best situ-
ated lands have been occupied, less profit can be made by cultivation of
what is inferior both in soil and situation," thus, as the economic com-
munity increases, profits fall. Wages, however, do not fall along with
profits, because the rapidity of accumulation does not slacken.
Smith, however, in qualification, admits that there is another cause
for rising profits, Declining wealth, or, "the diminution of the capital
stock of the society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of
industry" raises profits, because it causes a reduction in wages and a
rise in prices, so that "the owners of what stock remains in the society
can bring their goods at less expense to market than before, and less
stock being employed in supplying the market than before, they can
sell them dearer." 43 When a country's industry becomes stationary
(nondynamic),
both the wages of labor and the profits of stock would proba-
bly be very low. [T]he competition for employment would
necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages of labor to what
was barely sufficient to keep up the number of laborers,
[while] as great a quantity of stock would be employed in
every particular branch [of business] as the nature and extent
of the trade would admit, [so that the competition] would eve-
rywhere be as great, and consequently the ordinary profit as
low as possible.2 "
Thus Adam Smith's concept of profits is a historical one, one
which maintains that profits rise in a young state, but fall in an old
state. He so qualifies this outcome, however, that his theory often be-
comes slightly contradictory.
The Ricardian school, which looked on profits as mere surplus re-
maining to employers after having paid wages, totally rejected Adam
241. Id at 182-86.
242. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 87.
243. Id. at 94.
244. Id at 94-95.
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Smith's explanation of the historical fall of profits. They preferred to
attribute profits to the supposed diminution in the productiveness of
agricultural industry. The argument was that an increasing difficulty in
the production of corn would lower profits by raising wages. Wages
meant money wages not real wages, which were the amount of neces-
saries and conveniences enjoyed by the laborers. And this is "proven"
by showing that the price of corn is regulated by the quantity of labor
necessary to produce it with that portion of capital which pays no rent
and all manufactured commodities rise and fall in price in proportion
as more or less labor becomes necessary for their production.245
James Mill apparently agreed with Ricardo, although after he read
M'Culloch on this matter he seems to have changed his position some-
what.24
6
John Stuart Mill also agreed with the Ricardian doctrine that, "the
rate of profits depends upon wages; rising as wages fall, and falling as
wages rise," only considering it necessary to substitute for wages "what
Ricardo really meant," the "cost of labor."247
Although generally classical theorists accepted the Ricardian
theme of profits as mere surplus remaining to employers after they had
paid wages, there was some lack of agreement on the question of prof-
its.
Variations of Rent per acre
In Smith's very long chapter on rent, his main proposition is "that
every improvement in the circumstances of the society tends either di-
rectly or indirectly to raise the real rent of land, to increase the real
wealth of the landlord."2 4 He supports this proposition with four addi-
tional propositions:
[one], the landlord's share of the produce necessarily increases
with the increase of the produce; [two], the extended im-
provement and cultivation and . . . the rise in the price of
cattle, [the rude produce of land] for example . . . tends to
raise rent of land directly; [three], [a]11 those improvements in
the productive powers of labour which tend directly to reduce
the real price of manufactures tend indirectly to raise the real
rent of land; [four], [e]very increase in the real wealth of the
245. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 219-25; id at 225-29 (mathe-
matical proofs that Ricardo uses).
246. Id at 229-34.
247. Id at 234-44.
248. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 247.
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society, every increase in the quantity of useful labour em-
ployed within it, tends indirectly to raise the real rent of
land.249
In effect, Smith's position is that when society's circumstances are
improved, the landlord benefits because rent, directly and indirectly, in
four different ways, increases.
Ricardo, and his disciple, West, adopted the theory that the neces-
sity of cultivating inferior land to supply increased demand for food
raises rent. The proposition that the necessity of employing less produc-
tive industry in order to supply an increased demand for food causes a
rise in rent became an immediately accepted principle.25 0
Although there was some disagreement among the classical theor-
ists, generally speaking the Smith idea that good times raised rents be-
cause of the four propositions, coupled with the Ricardian proposition,
which was also based on good times, was accepted.251
Distribution Proper
Division of the Entire Produce Among Aggregate Wages, Aggregate
Profits, and Aggregate Rents
The above pseudo-distribution dealt with the ideas of economists
with regard to the causes of variations of wages per head, profits per
cent, and rent per acre. Distribution proper, however, deals with the
causes which determine the proportions in which total produce or in-
come of the community is divided among these classes: laborers, capi-
talists, and landlords, or labor, capital, and land.
In general, before Ricardo wrote, the question of distribution does
not seem to have occurred to anyone. The most that will be found on
the subject is incidental and incomplete.
Toward the end of the first chapter of the Principles, Ricardo says:
It is according to the division of the whole produce of the
land and labour of the country between the three classes of
landlords, capitalists, and labourers, that we are to judge of
rent, profit, and wages, and not according to the value at
which that produce may be estimated in a medium which is
confessedly variable.
249. Id. at 247-48.
250. It is interesting to note that Ricardo was so convinced of this proposition that he endeav-
ored to disprove the existence of other causes. See CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, sUpra
note 217, at 253-66.
251. Id Thomas Malthus and Richard Jones are two glaring examples.
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It is not by the absolute quantity of produce obtained by
either class that we can correctly judge of the rate of profit,
rent, and wages, but by the quantity of labour required to ob-
tain that produce. By improvements in machinery and agri-
culture the whole produce may be doubled; but if wages, rent
and profit be also doubled, these three will bear the same pro-
portions to one another as before, and neither could be said to
have relatively varied. But if wages partook not of the whole
of this increase; if they, instead of being doubled, were only
increased one-half, if rent, instead of being doubled, were
only increased three-fourths, and the remaining increase went
to profit, it would, I apprehend, be correct for me to say that
rent and wages had fallen, while profits had risen; ... 252
It is evident that what he wishes to say is that when wages and rent
increase, but in moderate proportion, then profits will increase substan-
tially.
Ricardo's arguments are interesting but involved.253 Only a sum-
mary of them can be set forth here. Ricardo postulates that the produce
of the entire economy of a nation can be divided between wages, profit,
and rent. He seems to have assumed that rent takes a larger proportion
of income in the "progress of society," with a resulting smaller propor-
tion left for wages and profits. Moreover, wages become a larger and
profits a smaller proportion of what is left for the two together. Conse-
quently, this tenet results in the proportion of the whole produce falling
to rent and the proportion to wages increases while the proportion fall-
ing to profits decreases. For the belief that rent increases in proportion,
he had little evidence. For the theory that wages become a larger pro-
portion of what is left, after rent has been deducted, he looked to the
previous assumption that wages rise with a rise in the price of neces-
saries and, further, to the assumption that the returns to agricultural
industry diminish in the progress of society.25 4 Since no one in the
classical school wrote on the subject other than Ricardo, his conclusion
is that of the classical theorist: The produce of the economy lies in
wages, profits, and rents; when prices in the economy go up, then rents
take the largest proportion, wages take a smaller part, and profits the
smallest.
252. D. RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 31 (Rhys ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited
as RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMY].
253. See CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCrION, supra note 217, at 268-78.
254. Id. at 278.
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Distribution of Wages Among Workers
It is such an obvious fact that the difference in wages between one
person and another lies in their industriousness and possession of skills
or lack of them that economists do not even bother to discuss what
appears to be so axiomatic. More important to them is the problem of
differences in earnings among persons of equal industry and ability. In
the famous chapter, "Of Wages and Profit in the Different Employ-
ments of Labour and Stock," Adam Smith talks about "perfect liberty"
and how under "perfect liberty" the advantages would amount to very
little and the differences in income and profit would be nil:
The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments of labour and stock must, in the same
neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tend-
ing to equality. If in the same neighbourhood, there was an
employment evidently either more or less advantageous than
the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one case,
and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages
would soon return to the level of other employments. This at
least would be the case in a society where things were left to
follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty,
and where every man was perfectly free both to chuse what
occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he
thought proper. Every man's interest would prompt him to
seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous em-
ployment.255
The gap that lies between wages and profits is caused by five principle
factors, all of them to a degree subjective: (1) the different agreeable-
ness of different employments, (2) the different cost of preparing per-
sons to pursue them, (3) the different constancy of employment in
them, (4) the different amount of trustworthiness required in them, and
(5) the different probability of success in them.
Still, Smith does not prove his major contention, that perfect lib-
erty causes the advantages and disadvantages of different employments
to be either equal or continually tending to equality. The five factors
only show why there is not perfect equality in a society without perfect
liberty, but not how perfect equality is attained in a society With perfect
liberty. Neither Ricardo nor Malthus, nor James Mill, nor Senior,
change this position taken by Adam Smith. J. S. Mill does attack two of
the "five principle circumstances" but does not seem to disagree with
255. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 99.
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the rest of the Smith thesis.256 On the whole then, the classical theorists
accept Smith's "perfect liberty" proposition with its modifying "cir-
cumstances."
Distribution of Profits Among Capitalists
The classical economists devoted little or no attention to the causes
which determine the distribution among its various holders of the capi-
tal of a country.257 Even J. S. Mill, who made extreme proposals for
obstructing the transmission of enormous fortunes from the deceased to
the living, offered no ideas pertaining to the accretion and subdivision
of these fortunes.2
Distribution of Rents Among Landlords
The distribution of the land of a country among landowners is the
first factor in determining the proportions in which the aggregate rental
is divided among the landlords. The classical economists devoted al-
most no attention to the subject.259
With regard to the second factor, which determines the distribu-
tion of rent as well as the different values of different areas of land,
there are a great many generalizations but most of the material is of
little importance. Adam Smith pretty much said what was generally
repeated by the rest. In brief, he said that the rent of any land was the
surplus of produce left after paying the expenses of cultivation and the
ordinary profits upon the capital employed. Land on which this surplus
was large would yield a large rent, and land on which the surplus was
small would yield a small rent. It is also evident that Smith thought
that where any local variations in the rate of profit were absent, then
any differences between the rent of various pieces of land would be
determined by the differences in its fertility and in its location.26 °
256. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 285-88.
257. Id. at 288-91.
258. Mill, Principles, supra note 138, at 220-29.
259. CANNAN, THEORIES OF PRODUCTION, supra note 217, at 291.
260. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 147, 212.
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XI. PART IX OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL-LABOR IS UNORGANIZED,
AND OTHER FACTORS OF PRODUCTION RECEIVE THE
REWARDS THAT THE MARKET
CONCEDES THEM
2 6 1
A. Historical Background of Classical Wage Theory
,Central to the classical labor theory was the idea of a man free to
give vent to his individualistic drives with a minimum of control or
restraint imposed by society. Adam Smith believed that "[e]very indi-
vidual [was] continually exerting himself to find out the most advanta-
geous employment for whatever capital he can command. ' 262 Those
who lacked capital were always searching for that employment in
which the monetary return for their labor would be the maximum of-
fered for their services. Should both capitalists and laborers be left
alone, self-interest would guide them to use their capital and labor
where they were most productive. There would be, then, a free market
in which producers competed for labor and consumer dollars in their
quest for more profits. Such competition would guarantee the direction
of capital and labor to their most productive uses and would ensure the
production of the goods consumers wanted and needed most (as mea-
sured by their ability and willingness to pay for them). Not only would
a free market be an incentive for constantly striving to improve the
quality of products but to constantly organizing production in the most
efficient and least costly manner possible. The market, Smith asserted,
would act as an "invisible hand" channeling self-centered motives into
mutually consistent and complementary activities that would best pro-
mote the welfare of the entire society.
The Genesis of Wage Theory
The gradual decline of the guild system in the seventeenth century
put an end to the old, and basically outworn, economic organization.
Commercialism sprang up to take the place of the guilds and rapidly
developed into competitive enterprises. Politics changed in such a way
that the state began to foster industrial expansion and capital accumu-
lation to protect the activities of businessmen. The need to increase the
capital values of the nation became important. Public control began to
be superseded by the inherent regulative power of competition. The
261. Much of this material is based on M. WERMEL, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLASSICAL
WAGE THEORY (1939) [hereinafter cited as WERMEL, THE EVOLUTION].
262. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 421.
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medieval concept of "just price" began to be abandoned in favor of the
action of supply and demand in the open market. In this respect En-
gland was the most advanced, and its writers on economics adopted the
central theme of lowering and fixing wages at as low a level as possible.
Thomas Mun, Joshua Gee, William Temple, and Bernard Mandeville
all believed the laborer should constantly toil in order to pay for the
day-to-day essentials of his existence.2 63
Another argument of a different character was also advanced.
Mun, Manley, Davenant, Yarranton, and Pollexfen believed that low-
wage labor would allow the manufacturer to put his commodity on the
market at a lower price, thus helping him to capture trade. These au-
thors felt strongly that workers were incorrigibly lazy, preferring to do
as little as possible rather than working to gain a higher standard of
living. A natural limit to wages, therefore, became the lowest possible
standard of living. Out of this theorizing evolved a universal agreement
in the business community that the cost ofsubsistenceforms the norm to
which the rate of wages ought to be adjusted.264
Thomas Culpeper, Josiah Child, and William Petyt proposed the
idea that the more people there are in a country the cheaper the wages
and the cheaper the manufactured goods. Conversely, the fewer the
people, the higher the wages and the more expensive the manufactured
goods. John Houghton concurred. Daniel Defoe presented the thesis
that wages are affected by two things: dearness of provisions and the
lack of people.265
These propositions formed the early foundations of wage theory.
As a result, firm structures, continually elaborated upon, were able to
be erected upon them.
John Locke's Subsistence Theory
John Locke was actually the first to state that the tendency of
wages is to fall to the minimum of the means of subsistence. He dis-
cussed the existence of a wage level that was inevitably limited to the
most immediate needs of the workers. He explained that such a wage
level existed because of a peculiar psychological inertia which was itself
created by the very fact that a low level of wages prevailed, saying;
[t]he poor laborer and handicraftsman cannot [bear it]: for he
just lives from hand to mouth already, and all his food, cloth-
263. See WERMEL, THE EVOLUTION, supra note 261, at 1-5.
264. Id. at 5-13.
265. Id. at 23-25.
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ing, and utensils costing a quarter more than they did before,
either his wages must rise with the price of things, to make
him live, or else, not being able to maintain himself and fam-
ily by his labor, he comes to parish; and then the land bears
the burden a heavier way.2 66
Locke added that
[flor the laborer's shares being seldom more than a bare sub-
sistence, never allows that body of men time or opportunity to
raise their thoughts above that, or struggle with the richer for
theirs [as one common interest] unless when some common
and great distress, uniting them in one universal ferment,
makes them forget respect and emboldens them to carve to
their wants with armed force; and then sometimes they break
in upon the rich, and sweep all like a deluge.2 67
That wages have a tendency to be fixed at a minimum level of bare
subsistence is Locke's point. He reasoned that a worker could not raise
himself above the poverty level because of his limited income. Psycho-
logically and socially, too, he could not do so because of his "respect
for the rich." Yet it is clear that Locke's political beliefs left a loophole
open for isolated revolt when misfortunes of vast extent would bring
about permanent changes in the living standard.
Locke seems to have had influence on such theoreticians as Mel-
choir von Osse, John Cary, Bernard Mandeville, Jacob Vandelint, and
Matthew Decker, all of whom presented similar theories on wages.268
Richard Cantillon's Ideas
Cantillon looked at the demand for labor as the factor controlling
wages and the supply of labor as dependent on it. Be believed that
farmers, laborers, and tradesmen adjusted to the demand for them. He
says:
It often happens that laborers and handicraftsmen have
not enough employment when there are too many of them to
share the business. It happens also that they are deprived of
work by accidents and by variations in demand, so that they
are overburdened with work according to circumstances. Be
that as it may, when they have no work they quit the villages,
towns or cities where they live in such numbers that those
who remain are always proportioned to the employment
266. Id. at 25-26.
267. Id.
268. Id at 27-29.
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which suffices to maintain them; when there is a continuous
increase of work there is gain to be made and enough others
to share it.
269
He also discusses individual wage rates. He points out that the la-
bor of a tradesman was valued at more than the labor of a farmer. He
explains:
The [working] life of a man is estimated but at 10 or 12
years, and as several are lost in learning a trade most of which
in England require 7 years of apprenticeship, a husbandman
would never be willing to have a trade taught to his son if the
mechanics did not earn more than the husbandmen.
Those who employ artisans or craftsmen must need
therefore pay for their labor at a higher rate than for that of a
husbandman or common laborer; and their labor will neces-
sarily be dear in proportion to the time lost in learning the
trade and the cost and risk incurred in becoming proficient. 270
If the owner uses slave labor, he needs only to provide subsistence
for the slaves. But if the owner uses vassals or free peasants then
[h]e will probably maintain them at a somewhat higher
level than slaves in accordance with the prevailing customs of
a given locality. But, in this case as well the labor or the free
laborer must correspond in value to twice the produce of the
soil which is necessary for his subsistence, [since the surplus
must be expended for the upbringing of his children],. .27.
Moreover, Cantillon maintains that a population will increase
quite rapidly up to the limit of the available means of subsistence.
Most, if not all classes, are subject to this law, especially the lower ones.
"The lower classes of inhabitants," he says, "do not even dream of any-
thing more than merely to marry and to bring up children who could
live in the same style as they are content to live themselves. 272
There are at bottom four parts to Cantillon's thinking that apply to
the theory of wages. Although they are somewhat disjointed, they do
enter as independent links into the development of that theory: (1)
wages are equalized by means of adapting the supply of labor to the
demand for it; (2) wages vary in different occupations because of differ-
ent conditions and circumstances; (3) there is a tendency for the wages
of hired labor to be maintained at subsistence level, "probably some-
269. Id. at 49.
270. Id. at 50.
271. Id. at 51.
272. Id. at 52.
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what exceeding" the standard of living of the slave; (4) population in-
crease is a factor in restricting and maintaining the prevailing
minimum level of wages.273
The Physiocrats-Turgot's Ideas-The First Formulation
of the "Iron Law"
Quesnay greatly concerned himself with the concepts of wage the-
ory. It was Turgot, however, who completed Quesnay's work and for-
mulated the first coherent and consistent theory of wages. The most
famous of Turgot's theses on wages was Reflexions sur laformation et la
distribution des richesses (1768). And under the heading, "The Wages of
Labor Are Limited by Competition among Workers to a Subsistence
Level. The Worker does not Receive more than is necessary for Life,"
Turgot wrote:
The common laborer who possesses only his hands and a
trade, has nothing but what he receives when he sells his labor
to others. He sells his labor power at a higher price or at a
lower price, but his higher or lower price does not depend
upon him alone. It is determined as a result of an agreement
with the one who pays for his work. The latter pays the lowest
amount possible, and since he has the opportunity of selecting
from a large number of workers, he will prefer those who will
work for the lowest wages. The workers are then obliged to
lower their wage prices in imitation of each other. In every
kind of work wages must be, and in reality are, limited by that
amount which is necessary to him for his subsistence.274
Turgot's opinion here is clear but generally is not much different
from Locke's ideas. Locke effectively said that wages are established at
the level of subsistence, since the purchaser of labor tries to pay the
laborer as low a wage as possible and the laborer is forced to agree to
the lowest scale, competition among laborers giving him no alternative.
Turgot, in a less well-known work, the Observations sur le Me moire de
M. Graslin, presents ideas of greater significance:
The exchange value of the products of the soil, given a
constant production, becomes a measure of wealth which the
framer obtains each year and which he must share with the
owner of the land. A high exchange value of the products of
the soil and an increased income give the landowner and the
farmer an opportunity to pay higher wages to the people who
273. Id. at 53.
274. Id at 62.
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live from the income of their labor alone. These higher wages,
on the other hand, give the hired laborers an opportunity to
increase their consumption and to enhance their welfare and
the high wage encourages the growth of population. . . . The
fertility of the soil attracts foreigners and increases the
number of people. A multiplication of the number of people,
in its turn, by virtue of competition, lowers wages, while the
number of people maintains consumption and exchange value
at the former level. The exchange value of food products,
profits, the level of wages and the population are phenomena
which are mutually interconnected and interdependent. The
balance among them is established in accordance with a pecu-
liar natural proportion and this proportion is constantly main-
tained if trade and competition are completely free.2 75
In addition, Turgot says, in effect, that the worse the economic
conditions of the laborer, the less is he able to control the conditions of
his labor. After wages are taxed, the entrepreneur will hardly agree at
first to increased wages. Thus the workers are forced to reduce con-
sumption and to live in poverty. This restricted consumption by the
laborer will reduce the demand for commodities and objects of neces-
sity. Therefore prices will fall. If the wages fall below subsistence level
then the worker will go elsewhere for his livelihood since otherwise he
cannot exist where he presently is employed. The population will de-
crease and the pool of laborers who are left will be so small that compe-
tition for their services will grow more severe and force the
entrepreneurs to increase the workingman's wages. The ultimate level
of wages will become established as a result of all such fluctuations and
this will be "the just price of their labor." However, this can only come
about by the exercise of a free choice between employers and employ-
ees.
276
What Turgot's theory boils down to is this:
In a commodity exchange economy the tendency of
wages to sink to the level of the minimum means of existence
is dependent on the reciprocal action of the specific parts and
relationships of this economy. Stability in these relationships
is attained through readjustments which occur when one part
of this economy deviates from the established norm. As one
section of the economy changes, it induces changes in other
sections, which react on the original change, bringing the first
275. Id. at 63.
276. Id at 62-65.
1978]
94
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JO UAAL
section back to its former condition.277
Turgot presented two types of such reaction and indicated two cy-
cles. The first cycle pertains to changes affecting prices. Changes in
wages cause the laborer's consumption to be less and, consequently,
lowering wages lowers the price of necessaries. On the other hand, rais-
ing wages causes an increase in the laborer's purchasing power because
he now demands more products; thus there is a re-establishment of the
former real income.
The second cycle concerns the welfare of the laborer. When wages
are reduced, existence for the laborer soon becomes impossible and the
laborer emigrates in search of better working conditions. Hence the la-
bor supply will decrease and the laborer's wages will go up to its former
level. This improvement will mean that higher pay will bring about an
influx of labor into the particular locality where such a condition
prevails.278
Turgot effectively formed, for the first time in the history of eco-
nomic thought, a self-contained wage theory-the first complete pres-
entation of the "iron law" of wages.
B. The Classical Synthesis of Wage Theory
Adam Smith, the Synthesizer
Adam Smith's initial analysis of the determination of wages is
based on two factors, social and economic. The social struggle, that
"struggle for distribution" among workmen and masters, is the root
cause of the contention. The relative strength of the respective forces
determines the level of income. He says:
What are the common wages of labor, depends every-
where upon the contract usually made between these two par-
ties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen
desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible
... . [Furthermore:] It is not, however, difficult to foresee
which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions,
have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a
compliance with their terms.2 79
The advantage lies with the employers because, (1) the employers,
who are few, can combine more easily; (2) the employers receive pro-
tection from the state in the form of statutes which outlaw strikes for
277. Id at 65.
278. Id at 65-70.
279. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 66 (emphasis added).
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higher wages; (3) the employer has more economic security than the
employee, thus he can hold out longer in the struggle for distribu-
tion.280
Since the entire problem in each separate case was reduced to the
relationship of social forces, any limits to wage fluctuations could be
presented only in relative terms. Smith does not mention an upper limit
to wages. The lower limit appears to rest on the "common humanity"
of employers.
The second element of Smith's wage theory is economic determi-
nation. When there is a scarcity of labor, employers bid for it and
wages rise. Smith says:
When in any country the demand for those who live by
wages, laborers, journeymen, servants of every kind, is contin-
ually increasing; when every year furnishes employment for a
greater number than had been employed the year before, the
workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise their
wages. The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among
masters, who bid against one another, in order to get work-
men, and thus voluntarily break through the natural combi-
nation of masters not to raise wages.28'
That, in Smith's terms, is the nature of wages in a rapidly prog-
ressing economy. In a stationary economy there would be too many
laborers. And the laborers would bid against each other and "soon re-
duce them[selves] to this lowest rate [of wages] which is consistent with
common humanity." 28 2
In a country with a decaying economy, the competition for em-
ployment would be so great that the wages would be reduced to mere
subsistence: "famine and mortality" would take their toll until the
number of inhabitants was reduced to those who could be main-
tained.28 3
In this manner, Smith analyzes the conflict in society, which is al-
ways subject to the limiting effects of economic factors in relation to a
self-contained complex of economic conditions. He expresses it well
when he says
Every species of animals naturally multiplies in propor-
tion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever
multiply beyond it. But in civilized society it is only among
280. Id. at 66-67.
281. Id at 68.
282. Id at 71.
283. WEmE.L, THE EVOLUTION, supra note 261, at 134.
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the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of subsistence
can set limits to the further multiplication of the human spe-
cies; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a
great part of the children which their fruitful marriages pro-
duce.2 84
He goes on to say that men, like any other commodity, are regulated by
supply and demand. What men produce quickens when there are too
few to hire and abates when they produce too much.
Smith postulates that the factors regulating the level of wages and
those regulating the level of prices display a basic parallelism. But he
fails to conclude that the price of labor, like the price of all other com-
modities, has one unified permanent level: the level of the minimal
costs for the production of the commodity.
Thomas Malthus: Population Control
In Principles of Population, Thomas Malthus sounded a warning
that the possibilities of sustained progress were endangered by the
rapid rise in population. The rate of population growth had been ex-
tremely slow in the Middle Ages but it had gained considerable mo-
mentum in the eighteenth century. Despite this growth in Europe, and
especially in England, no additional land seemed to be available for
cultivation to support more people. Farming techniques, while fairly
effective over most of Europe, seemed to be stationary and not subject
to rapid improvement. Malthus, with respect to these conditions, as-
serted that populations have a tendency to outgrow food supply. Such
an imbalance between the rate of population growth and the rate of
increase in agricultural output, Malthus declared, would lead to the
spread of poverty. In order to rectify this situation, Malthus advocated
a slowing down of population increase.
Malthus in all likelihood had a theory of wages, but it is unimpor-
tant at this point.2 5 Of importance to future economists was his theory
of population control, later used by Ricardo to explain the "iron law"
of wages.
David Ricardo: "Iron Law" of Wages
Ricardo commenced his study of wages by agreeing with Adam
Smith that labor is a commodity and subject to supply and demand. He
284. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 117, at 79.
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also agreed that "the natural price of labor is the price which is neces-
sary to enable the laborers, one with another, to subsist and to perpetu-
ate their race, without either increase or diminution. '286 Ricardo
continues by discussing labor's market price. This natural price is the
price that is actually paid for it from the operation of supply and de-
mand. Consequently, labor is expensive when it is in short supply and
cheap when it is plentiful. Whatever deviation there is from its natural
price, labor, like commodities, has a tendency to conform to natural
price.287 Ricardo goes on to say that when the market price of labor
exceeds its natural price, labor's condition is "flourishing and happy."
But when because of high prices there is an increase in laborers, then
wages fall again to the natural price. When the market price of labor is
below the natural price, the condition of labor is "wretched." When the
labor population is reduced, then the price of labor will rise to the natu-
ral one and labor will have "moderate comforts" afforded by the natu-
ral rate of wages.
The assumption that labor is analogous to commodities is followed
to its logical conclusion. He continues his analogy by stating that the
quantity offood and necessaries determining the natural price is sharply
defned and limited by strict necessity. Thus wages become fixed by the
amount of the laborer's necessary means of subsistence. This leads to
Ricardo's assumptions that the relationship between capitalism (profit)
and labor (wages) is such that the share of one can be increased only to
the extent to which the share of the other is diminished. Wages are
increased only at the expense of profit and vice versa.
If the "iron law" is defined as a combination of factors which
brings wages down to the minimal means of subsistence, as later used
by Lassalle, then clearly Ricardo was the author of the law.288 Even
though Adam Smith showed the connections that existed between
wages and natural movements of population and displaying the ways
of their interaction, he did not present a "natural" level of wage fluctu-
ations and a norm to which they "naturally" return. This idea was Ri-
cardo's. 28
9
"It would seem that the entire contents of the remarkable
Principles are, in essence nothing but a set of critical commentaries on
the theoretical theses of The Wealth of Nations," Michael Wermel com-
286. RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMY, supra note 252, at 50.
287. Id. at 50-5 1.
288. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), the German socialist, labor leader, and political econo-
mist, gave the "iron law" its name and brought out its social and political significance.
289. WERMEL, THE EVOLUTION, supra note 261, at 158-59.
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ments.29° Yet Ricardo compressed, elucidated, and made a most per-
ceptive conceptual addition to the theory of wages in order to arrive at
the "iron law" that governs them.
Many economists have stated that Ricardo owed a debt to Malthus
for the theory.2 91 The ideas about population were clearly essential,
and Malthus is the one who popularized them. He probably did have
some influence on Ricardo.
The Modification of the Classical Theory by the
Wages Fund Theory of John Stuart Mill
The main theory of classical economics was the "iron law" of
wages. But John Stuart Mill is recognized by almost everyone as a
classical economist and his thinking on labor in his Principles of Polit-
calEconom/A9 caused a shift in emphasis from the pressure of popula-
tion on labor supply to the somewhat more hopeful factor of the
demand for labor. With this shift in emphasis, the subsistence theory
gave way to the theory of wages fund which was in effect a modifica-
tion of the subsistence theory.293
The theory presents the idea of the market price of labor, rather
than its long-term natural price, which was regarded as successfully ex-
plained by the subsistence theory. Mill describes it as a portion of what
he calls "circulating capital." "Circulating capital" is held by entrepre-
neurs who had accumulated it from their operations in previous years.
Part of this circulating capital is used to purchase facilities and materi-
als, paying rent and interest. Another portion, however, is allo-
cated-the wages fund-to buy labor. The amount of their allocation
to wages, plus the supply of labor to be employed, controls the market
price for labor in each working period.294
Mill looks upon the wage fund as relatively fixed in the short run,
and he holds it to be an "advance" to labor in the system of production
that he calls "industrial capitalism."
290. Id.
291. F. BAERWALD, ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR 76-77 (2d. ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as BAERWALD, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS]; BELL, ECONOMIC THOUGHT, .upra
note 1, at 226; A. TOLLES, ORIGINS OF MODERN WAGE THEORIES 12 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
TOLLES, MODERN WAGE].
292. Mill, Princples, supra note 138.
293. BAERWALD, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 291 at 78; M. DOBB, WAGES 108 (3d
ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as DOBB, WAGES].
294. A. GITLow, LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 300-01 (1957); BAER-
WALD, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 291, at 78-79; TOLLES, MODERN WAGE, supra note
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This theory was not as rigid as the "iron law" of wages theory; yet
it too was principally used to show that bargaining power or trade-
union action was impotent to alter the wage level as a whole because
whatever one group of workers gained in excess of the market price
had to be subtracted from what was in the wages fund to distribute to
other wage earners. Mill regarded the theory as displaying an unchang-
ing and unchangeable law of supply and demand.
Both theories, i.e. "the iron law" and Mills's modification, show
that the laborer must act as a free agent. Any group action (e.g., a labor
union) could not benefit him because the wage level cannot be
changed.
XII. CONCLUSION
This article has examined each of the nine parts of the Classical
Model proposed by Gregory Grossman, showing it to be a blend of
economics and politics. The economic, in the Classical Model, func-
tions, though springing from nature, like a self-regulating mechanism,
mirroring in its way the clockwork universe of Newton and the deists,
able to adjust automatically to external forces that threaten its equilib-
rium or natural state. The Classical Model is comprised of a number of
parts that synchronize, each depending, as it were, on the oil of ration-
ality to smoothly mesh gears one with the other. Such parts of the
whole are the entrepreneur, laborer, and consumer, who are rational
people pursuing their own interests. Such, too, are the buyers and sell-
ers, and, because their self-interest as reasonable men could be only
beneficial to themselves, it would follow that such benefits would ac-
crue to the community at large through competition in a free, open
market. The buyers and sellers would never, of course, grow too big
and powerful to impose their will on others. Such groups as households
and business organizations would be free to choose the goods they
wished to buy and produce. Prices would move freely. The "invisible
hand" of rationality, the Logos at work, would coordinate production
and incomes would be distributed, in accordance with Natural Law, in
this ideal open market-place.
As for politics, government would not interfere with business but
would support the economy through the basic services it could more
efficiently provide.
Underlying both the economic and political elements of the model
was ownership of property. Although the ideas concerning property
were ancient ones, the Enlightenment gave them unique status. The
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idea of property itself became the core around which man formed and
established his relationship to the state and his place in his social envi-
ronment. This article has traced the growth of the conception of owner-
ship from its beginnings in Greece in order to show how the
Enlightenment developed the outstanding position that property en-
joyed in the Classical Model. It has been assumed that property and its
ownership could not be discussed without considering two related
ideas: the individual's position vis-a -vis the state (right) and the reason
for this position (Natural Law). The evolution of these ideas and how
they affected thought during the Enlightenment have been set forth his-
torically.
Greek and medieval society, mainly because both subsumed to re-
ligion ownership on any grander scale than farming and household
goods, denied the rights of the individual. They saw property, under
Natural Law, as existing for the benefit of the entire community and
not the specific individual. In the meantime, the Roman Stoic created
an egocentric person who lived in a nonorganic community that de-
fined the ownership of property as a natural right, a birthright, which it
was the duty of the state to protect.
The Enlightenment was fully cognizant of the thinking of all three
periods. It proceeded to mingle their philosophies, embracing enthusi-
astically the Greek, Stoic, and medieval ideas of Natural Law, and ar-
rived by synthesis at its own idealogy about the nature of property and
the pertinent rights thereof. Except as it belonged to the community as
a whole, including most importantly the religious community, in the
Greek and medieval societies property was not the fulcrum upon which
their economy turned. With the advent of individual ownership as the
Roman Stoic saw it, the fulcrum and the lever became more apparent.
Under Locke and the Classical Economists, however, property, its own-
ership and use, became the whole machine by which the economy oper-
ated.
The combining of right and Natural Law with property, as the
thinkers of the Enlightenment formulated the technique, resulted in an
explosive product: property is a natural right of man. According to
Locke, property, therefore, can be appropriated by man through the
efforts of his labor.
Labor, thus, becomes a source for the acquisition of property and
lays the foundation for all claims to wealth. As a consequence, this con-
cept of property, as a natural right under Natural Law, with man's la-
[Vol. 13:406
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bor upon it bringing him wealth and the maximization of profit,
becomes a fundamental precept of the Classical Model.
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